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  ABSTRACT:
The single sign-on mechanism (SSO) is a well-known technique to protect access to a set of
resources that require prior authentication and, possibly, additional authorization. The idea
behind  the  single  sign-on  procedure  consists  of  requesting  the  user  to  provide  access
credentials  once  and,  thereafter,  granting  access  to  any  of  the  resources.  Besides  the
practical benefits the user gets, this mechanism implies several limitations and drawbacks,
like granting an "all or nothing" access to all the resources, or making a simple attack to just
one user-name and password pair very dangerous because, when successful, it can provide
full access to all the protected resources.
In this work we first design an SSO solution following a classical architecture consisting of a
central authentication server and a user directory,  dedicated to protect a set of internal
applications behind a perimeter network.
We explore how to define more complex security policies for a set of resources that could
allow setting multiple levels of authorization for the resources so that some users may only
be able to access a subset of the resources depending on their authorization level. 
Also, we test the use of multiple factors of authentication to access the resources in order to
enhance  their  security  by  requesting  different  types  of  user  credentials  (e.g.,  user-
name/password pairs or digital certificates). 
In  this  solution  we also  demonstrate  how passing information to  the  client  applications
about  login  procedure  attributes  allows  implementing  more  complex  authorization
techniques to protect access to these resources. Finally, we implement a basic case of a
single sign-off mechanism.
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  RESUM:
El mecanisme d’inici de sessió únic (SSO) és una coneguda tècnica per a protegir l’accés a un conjunt 
de recursos que requereixen autenticació i, possiblement, autorització addicional. La idea darrere d’un
procediment d’inici de sessió únic consisteix en demanar a l’usuari que proporcioni les credencials 
d’accés una sola vegada però que se li concedeixi l’accés a tots els recursos a partir d’aquí. A més 
dels avantatges pràctics que n’obté l’usuari, aquest mecanisme comporta diverses limitacions i 
inconvenients, com ara un accés “tot o res” a tots els recursos o fer que un atac simple a només un 
nom d’usuari i contrasenya sigui molt perillós perquè, de tenir èxit, proporciona accés complet a tots 
els recursos protegits.
En aquest treball primer dissenyem una solució SSO tot seguint una arquitectura clàssica formada per 
un servidor d’autenticació central, juntament amb un directori d’usuaris, dedicat a protegir un conjunt 
d’aplicacions internes darrere d’una xarxa perimetral.
A continuació explorarem com definir polítiques de seguretat més complexes per a un conjunt de 
recursos que permetin definir diversos nivells d’autorització dels recursos de manera que alguns 
usuaris només puguin accedir a un subconjunt dels recursos en funció del seu nivell d’autorització.
A més, posem a prova l’ús de diversos factors d’autenticació per a accedir als recursos per millorar la 
seva seguretat sol·licitant diferents tipus de credencials d’usuari (per exemple, nom 
d’usuari/contrasenya o certificats digitals).
En aquesta solució també demostrem com l’enviament d'informació sobre atributs del procediment 
d'inici de sessió a les aplicacions client permet implementar tècniques d'autorització més complexes 
per a protegir l'accés a aquests recursos. Finalment, implementem un cas bàsic de mecanisme de 
desconnexió única.
  RESUMEN:
El mecanismo de inicio de sesión único (SSO) es una técnica bien conocida para proteger el acceso a
un conjunto de recursos que requieren autenticación y, posiblemente, autorización adicional. La idea
detrás de un procedimiento de inicio de sesión único consiste en solicitar al usuario que proporcione
credenciales de acceso una vez pero que otorgue acceso a todos los recursos a partir de entonces.
Aparte de los beneficios prácticos que obtiene el usuario este mecanismo implica varias limitaciones y
desventajas como otorgar un acceso de "todo o nada" a todos los recursos o hacer que un ataque
simple  a  un  solo  nombre  de  usuario  y  contraseña  sea  muy  peligroso  porque,  de  tener  éxito,
proporciona acceso completo a todos los recursos protegidos.
En este trabajo, primero diseñamos una solución SSO siguiendo una arquitectura clásica consistente
en un servidor de autenticación central, junto con un directorio de usuarios, dedicado a proteger un
conjunto de aplicaciones internas detrás de una red perimetral.
Luego exploramos cómo definir políticas de seguridad más complejas para un conjunto de recursos
que permitan definir  múltiples niveles de autorización para estos recursos,  de modo que algunos
usuarios solo puedan acceder a un subconjunto de los recursos según su nivel de autorización.
También probamos el uso de múltiples factores de autenticación para acceder a los recursos con el fin
de mejorar su seguridad al solicitar diferentes tipos de credenciales de usuario (por ejemplo, nombre
de usuario/contraseña o certificados digitales).
En esta solución además demostramos cómo el pasar información sobre atributos del procedimiento
de  inicio  de  sesión  a  las  aplicaciones  cliente  permite  implementar  técnicas  de  autorización  más
complejas para proteger el acceso a estos recursos. Finalmente, implementamos un caso básico de
mecanismo de cierre de sesión único.
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1  Introduction
1.1 Context and Justification
This project is based on a proposal by ANCERT1 to implement a single sign-on (SSO) solution
capable of authenticating users to an application server by using either passwords or digital
certificates. Depending on the type of credentials used to authenticate, the user will be granted
access to a different set of applications among those installed in the application server.  In
addition to that, the applications should be able to retrieve some information about the logged-
in user from the authentication server and the user repository(*) 2.
It is also a requirement in the proposal that the implemented solution must be based on open
source projects such as Apereo CAS or  OpenAM. Also, it is required that the authentication
and application servers must be protected from direct access from the Internet by the use of
proxy servers(*) located in a perimeter network(*). Indeed, to enhance security it is a common
architectural pattern to protect the servers in the internal network from the Internet by using
an intermediate network or demilitarized zone(*) (DMZ). Thus, the connections attempted from
the external network to the protected servers in the internal network are performed through
proxy servers.
As we will further analyze, this is a common scenario for corporate environments where a set of
resource servers, in this case application servers, need to be accessible for the corporation
users, either internal (e.g., employees) or external (e.g., customers or providers).
In  a  very  simplistic  scenario,  these  internal  applications  would  require  every  user  to
authenticate separately to each one of the applications. To avoid these repetitive login steps, a
single  sign-on  mechanism  is  implemented  in  such  a  way  that,  after  a  first  successful
authentication to any of the applications, the following accesses to any other application are
automatically granted to the user without prompting again for the user’s credentials.
One side effect of this basic SSO scheme is that the user gets access to  all the applications
protected by the authentication server. While this is sometimes the required behavior, in some
scenarios not all the protected applications in the same environment should be accessible for a
given user but just a smaller subset of them according to some corporate policy. In this case,
an ordered set of access privileges can be defined so that a user with an access level of, say, 2
cannot use resources with access level 3, but access is effectively granted to resources at level
1 just with one login operation.
Although this multilevel3 authorization(*) scheme for SSO provides enhanced capabilities to
configure  and manage  access  to  a  set  of  applications,  it  may imply  new,  but  not  always
evident, consequences that we will explore in the theoretical study in this work. Furthermore,
this layered approach should be not confused with multifactor authentication(*), where more
than  one  kind  of  credentials  are  requested  from the  user  within  the  same authentication
operation (e.g., a pair of user/password plus a one-time sent SMS code). We will explore the use
of passwords and digital certificates as authentication factors.
The final result of this project is, therefore, the implementation of an SSO solution for a set
of applications, protected with passwords and/or certificates under a multilevel access policy.
Also, an exploratory theoretical analysis of the authentication function and its implications
will be presented.
1 Agencia Notarial de Certificación: https://www.ancert.com/ 
2 Terms marked with (*) are explained in the glossary chapter.
3 Multilevel and multifactor are sometimes used interchangeably in different contexts. We will use the term 
multilevel to refer to authorization permissions and multifactor to refer to types of user credentials.
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2  Single Sign-On Authentication 
2.1 Motivation 
A common practice to access a secured resource, like a corporate application in a networked
environment, is to request the user to provide some kind of credentials in other to verify that
the user is who he claims to be. This process is known as authentication. This authentication
process can be performed by the very final system being accessed. The credentials validation
may consist of simply verifying a valid match of user-name and password or may consist of a
more sophisticated technique like a presenting and verifying a digital certificate or entering an
SMS code just created and sent for this authentication attempt. 
In  any  case,  in  some scenarios  this  same user  may  have  to  authenticate  against  several
systems in an internal network in order to perform her expected daily work. For example, this
would be the case of a corporate employee who needs to log in to the local workstation, access
the corporate e-mail server, work with one or more enterprise applications and access some
external  services,  like  Google  Drive,  Dropbox,  etc.  The  user  is,  therefore,  forced  to  enter
several user-name/passwords, one for each system she needs to access. Moreover, when more
sophisticated authentication schemes are introduced, for example by requiring a  two-factor
authentication4,  the number of options that the user has to remember grows rapidly. These
repetitive, annoying actions may have the unwanted side effect of leading the user to simplify
these  procedures  by  setting,  for  example,  the  same user/password  for  all  the  systems,  a
practice that decreases the security of the whole system.
2.2 Basic SSO authentication
The  Single  Sign-On  (SSO) authentication  is  a  well  known,  broadly  used  authentication
mechanism for these environments, where there exists the need to simplify multiple logging
operations to several applications. 
In this approach, when the user tries to access any of the applications for the first time, the
final application redirects the user to a central server that performs the actual authentication
on behalf of this application and also records the result of the authentication. Then, when the
user  tries  to  access  a  second  application,  the  same  redirection  to  the  central  server  is
performed but this time the authentication server is able to determine that this user has been
successfully logged in and grants this user access to the second application without prompting
for credentials. This process happens behind the scenes and the user experiences immediate
access to the second application without having to enter again the credentials.
This basic mechanism can be implemented in several ways depending on the need to support
different  authentication  schemes  (e.g.,  user-names/passwords,  digital  certificates  in  the
browser,  cryptographic  pen-drives,  SMS  codes,  etc.)  or  the  need  for  policies  defining
combinations of authorizations to access some of the internal resources.
Indeed, it is important to notice that, in this simplified scenario, this authentication process
(verifying who the user is) actually leads to an implicit authorization to use all the applications
protected by the same authentication server. However, granting the user any rights to use a
given resource, the authorization, is a different process than authenticating the user. 
Finally, a common practice is to provide the internal application with additional information
about the users and their expected roles concerning the application. This allows the application
to customize the user experience and even more to authorize, or not, some features in the
application.
2.2.1 SSO trade-offs
Selecting a Single Sign-On as an authentication mechanism for a set of resources is not free
from some trade-offs. The final decision about implementing an SSO solution should, therefore,
4 The two-factor authentication (2FA) is a current trend in web applications, where the user is required to enter a 
random code received via SMS just after having entered the correct user-name and password. 
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be  made  by  considering  both  the  benefits  and  the  disadvantages  of  this  authentication
mechanism, especially in a scenario with multiple levels of authorization.
As a high level summary, the advantages of using an SSO mechanism are:
• One-time login: the user logs in only once (for a given period of time) no matter how
many applications under the control of a given SSO solution will use.
• Centralized  administration:  the  management  of  the  user  repository  and  the
authentication policies are moved from each application to a central server, unifying the
configuration of the application authentication and authorization processes. 
• Reduced surface attack: because the applications do not store authentication data
such as the passwords of each user that are centralized in the user’s repository, the
places where a leak of that information can happen are reduced.
And the disadvantages that an SSO implementation can imply are:
• Lack of user information: under this scheme, the applications lose the information
about the users because in some basic implementations this data is stored in the user
repository and the SSO server just provides the application with a binary result, i.e.,
whether the user was authenticated or not.
• Unlimited access: the user logged in one system has access to all the resources or
applications under the same SSO server. This effect can be modulated with the use of
access policies, like the multilevel authorization that we will explore.
• Single point of failure: once the authentication is centralized a very high dependency
of  the  central  authorization  server  availability  is  introduced.  If  the  server  fails,  no
application can be used. Fault tolerance, high availability techniques should be put in
place to deal with this risk.
We will  explore these challenges and alternatives  when defining the final  architecture and
design of the solution to implement.
2.3 Available SSO solutions
The SSO approach has been in use for a long time in the industry. This means, in practical
terms, that a great number of solutions are already available in the market5. 
These solutions can be divided into two broad categories: 
• commercial solutions: developed by a given manufacturer with their own proprietary
implementation  choices  and closed source  code,  but  possibly  optimized for  a  given
technology or product line.
• open source solutions: developed by a broad community of users with the source
code available and, usually, under non-restrictive licenses.
All the actual alternatives usually provide a broader set of functionality besides the SSO itself,
such as access management6, federation of systems. legacy technology compatibility, etc.
2.3.1 Open Source solutions
Among the open source solutions, the following can be considered the main choices for a new
SSO project:
• OpenAM: This product was initially developed by Sun Microsystems as OpenSSO. After
this company was acquired by Oracle Corporation, the project was forked by ForgeRock.
When this company closed the source code, a new fork(*) of the codebase was created
and is now maintained by the Open ID Platform community7 under the name OpenAM.
The  SSO  solution  is  part  of  a  broader  portfolio  of  identity  management  solutions
including directory services, access management, etc. 
5 See, for example, the Wikipedia specific article about the list of SSO implementations: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_single_sign-on_implementations 
6 To avoid confusion between authentication and authorization, some literature, especially commercial copy, may 
use the terms identity management and access management, respectively.
7 https://www.openidentityplatform.org/ 
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• Keycloack:  As  part  of  the  JBoss  portfolio,  Keycloack8 is  the  Red  Hat  solution  for
Identity  and  access  management.  Like  other  broad  solutions,  it  provides  SSO
capabilities as one of the features of the product. The recent acquisition of Red Hat by
IBM poses some doubts about the future roadmap of this portfolio of solutions.
• Apereo CAS: This solution started out as an internal solution at  Yale University.  Later
on, the project joined the Java in Administration Special Interest Group (JASIG). In 2012,
JASIG and the Sakai Foundation joined into the Apereo Foundation9 where the solution is
maintained as Apereo CAS. This solution initially implemented its own authentication
protocol known as  CAS  (now in version 3.0) but later incorporated support for other
standard, open protocols, like  OAuth10, which makes this product a flexible option for
SSO implementations.
2.3.2 Commercial solutions
Most of the main software companies offer an SSO solution, usually integrated with products of
broader capabilities, like access control, system federation, web services or API security, etc.
These products are usually tightly integrated with each manufacturer’s product line although
some may just be rebranded, existing open source solutions. Examples are:  Microsoft Active
Directory Federation Services11, Oracle IAM12, IBM Enterprise Identity Mapping13, etc.
However, many independent vendors have started to offer SSO solutions in the cloud under a
software as a service(*) (SaaS) model. Two of the main cloud providers are:
• Okta: The provider Okta14 offers access management solutions in the cloud, which also
provide  SSO  capabilities.  This  offer  is  mainly  directed  towards  corporate  users  to
integrate access to all their applications in one place. 
• Auth0:  This  authentication  and  authorization  offering  from  Auth015 is  directed  to
application developers but can also escalate to enterprises. 
Selecting a commercial  solution may depend on several  factors,  the main being having an
already installed base of applications and infrastructure services from a given manufacturer
(e.g., a Windows Server based company will probably choose Microsoft ADFS). 
Nonetheless, it is not so uncommon that companies now choose to install open source based
solutions but integrated with their proprietary applications in an effort to migrate to an open
source model and avoid vendor lock-in(*).
8 https://www.keycloak.org/ 
9 https://www.apereo.org/ 
10 https://oauth.net/ 
11 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/active-directory-federation-services 
12 https://www.oracle.com/cloud/security/cloud-services/identity-access-cloud.html 
13 https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_71/rzalv/rzalvmst.htm 
14 https://www.okta.com/ 
15 https://auth0.com/
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3  Project Definition
3.1 Purpose
The purpose of this project is to study the practical application of the single sign-on mechanism
when a policy of access based on levels must be in place for a set of resources, in our case, an
application server with several software applications installed.
By access levels we must understand that a user having access to, say, level 3 applications, is
also  granted  access  to  applications  of  a  lower  level.  Contrarily,  a  user  given  access  to
applications at level 2 has no access to any application of a higher level.
Specifically, the main goal is to implement a solution as described in the high-level diagram
and the description below:
In this scenario, a user accessing from a client device some application, e.g., App1, connects to
the application via a proxy (1,2) in the DMZ. 
The application redirects (3) this access attempt to an authentication server. This server now
requests the user to provide valid credentials, on behalf of App1 and always via a proxy (4,5).
The  provided  credentials  (6,7)  are  checked  by  the  authentication  server  against  the  user
repository (8,9) and, upon successful authentication, the information about the permissions,
and probably some additional user information, are sent back to the application (10) to provide
the expected functionality to the user (11,12).
After the first successful login, if the user wants to access another internal application, like
App2, the same flow is repeated with the exception of the authentication server prompting
again the user for new access credentials (4,5,6,7). 
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3.2 Objectives
The main goals for this project are:
• (O1) To define the architecture and the detailed design of a solution capable of solving
the challenges described before.
• (O2) To implement a solution, as specified in the design, consisting of at least:
◦ (O2.1) a centralized authentication server along with a common user repository
(see Technological restrictions below),
◦ (O2.2) an application server with several custom applications installed. 
◦ (O2.3) each of these applications will have different, increasing access levels and
will require different authentication techniques, specifically:
▪ App1 will be accessible to any user in the directory
▪ App2 will be accessible by users with a valid user-name and password
▪ App3 will be accessible by users with a valid user-name and password or with a
valid digital certificate
▪ App4 will be accessible by users only with a valid digital certificate
▪ users  accessing  any  application  will  be  granted  SSO  access  to  lower  lever
applications  (e.g.,  access  to  App3  provides  SSO  authentication  to  App2  and
App1, but not to App4).
• (O3) To allow the protected applications to retrieve some information about the user
and the login operation.
• (O4) To implement  a  demilitarized zone  (DMZ) to  protect  these servers  from direct
access from the  Internet.
• (O5) To provide the tools to issue and verify digital certificates for those users that may
be required to access some of the applications with the type of credential.
Additional goals are:
• (O6) To characterize, from a theoretical point of view, an  SSO policy,  to allow a more
formal specification of the behavior that the final solution must implement.
• (O7) To analyze further implications, both theoretical and practical, about the different
scenarios that a more complex authentication function may provide in comparison to
just  a  simpler  user-name/password  authentication  scheme  (e.g.,  should  users
successfully logged in App4 access App2 according to objective O2.3?) 
3.3 Other requirements and constraints
3.3.1 Solution constraints
• (R1) For the open source based SSO solution, we choose to use Apereo CAS. 
• (R2) For the user repository, the chosen solution must implement the LDAP protocol. 
• All  other  technological  choices  for  the  application  server,  user  repository,  etc.  are
delayed to a later phase.
3.3.2 Cultural constraints
• (R3) All the documentation of the project will be written in American English. Also, all
the computer code, user interface and other project deliverables for the implemented
solution will be in American English.
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3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Practical approach
The nature of this project is practical, the main goal being to implement a proof of concept for
the specified SSO scenario. 
Nonetheless,  an  analysis  of  the  authentication  and  authorization  processes  considered  as
functions with credentials as inputs and permissions as outputs will take a more theoretical,
qualitative approach.
The main strategy to implement the SSO solution is to select and use existing open source
products  for  each  component  of  the  final  architecture  (i.e.,  authentication  server,  user
repository, etc.) and configure and integrate all of them into a final product that satisfies the
specified goals.
3.4.2 Project management
Given the time constraints and compulsory partial deliverables of the project, we will apply a
predictive  project  management(*) method.  Despite  this  deterministic  approach,  successive
iterations to refine or rework some deliverables throughout the development may take place. 
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4  Project Plan
4.1 Project Scope
In  this  project  we  will  explore  different  mechanisms  to  configure  and  manage  these
authentication/authorization challenges for an SSO solution. 
On one hand, we will use both user-names/passwords and digital certificates to require some
form of  multiple factor authentication.  On the other,  we will  also configure a  multiple
level authorization scheme such that successfully logging in to an application of a given level
will grant access to applications with equal or lower levels, but not to applications with higher
levels. 
Finally, we will explore mechanisms for the internal applications to get some information about
the successfully logged in user from the user repository.
4.1.1 Work Breakdown Structure 
The scope of the project can be broken down into the following main work packages:
The  work  of  the  project  will  consist  of  a  theoretical  study  and  an  actual  SSO  solution
implementation plus a final analysis of the results obtained with this implementation. Also,
included in the total  work of  the project  are the required formal  documents  for  the thesis
submission.
The  Theoretical  Study  will  characterize  the  SSO  policy  specification  from  a  general
perspective and analyze the different alternatives available for the later implementation of the
components of the solution. 
It will consist of:
• SSO characterization:  The authentication/authorization process can be modeled by
means  of  what  we  will  call  authentication  and  authorization  functions taking  the
provided credentials as inputs and the resulting authorized resources as outputs. We will
study how far this model can be developed and how it applies to the specific case under
discussion.
• Alternatives Analysis: An analysis of the different, available alternatives for the actual
implementation of  the practical  case.  We will  focus on open source alternatives,  as
required by the original proposal, and justify the selection of each of them. 
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Also, a working  SSO Solution  will be implemented to test and validate the hypothesis and
choices made in the theoretical study. 
Two work packages are defined:
• Solution design: First, a detailed architecture and design for the SSO solution will be
developed plus the necessary work environment and ancillary tools to develop and test
its functionality. This will include both the centralized SSO part of the solution and the
application server with custom applications that will use it. 
• Solution development: Second, the actual solution will be implemented following the
requirements and choices made before. The development of the solution will require the
implementation of:
◦ a development environment: to build the final applications and the SSO solution,
as well as the necessary tools to provide digital certificates to the users.
◦ the actual implementation: of a computer network with, at least, an SSO server
plus a user repository, an application server with all the final applications protected
with the SSO solution.
The Results & Documentation part of the work includes two major work packages that will
be completed after the implementation and testing of the solution. 
These are:
• a discussion of the actual results obtained from the solution implementation and
possible lessons learned in the process,
• the compulsory deliverables for the thesis submission, namely, the thesis document
or memory, and a presentation/demonstration video of the final solution.
4.1.2 Out of scope
It is not included in the scope of this project:
• using authentication credentials other than user-names and passwords pairs or digital
certificates.
• using user repository implementations other than an LDAP based server.
• using client devices other than internet browsers to connect via secure HTTP protocol to
the application server and to eventually provide a digital certificate.
• dealing with load balancing and high availability features on the final implementation
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4.2 Project Schedule 
The work of the project is distributed in a period of 16 weeks, corresponding to an academic
semester. In the following high-level schedule the main activities and deliverables are shown
along with the main milestones.
Start End Main project activities and deliverables Academic milestones
1 Sept 18 Sept 22 Project planning
2 Sept 23 Sept 29
3 Sept 30 Oct 6 Theoretical SSO modeling Oct 1st - Project Plan
4 Oct 7 Oct 13 Alternatives analysis
5 Oct 14 Oct 20 Architecture of the solution
6 Oct 21 Oct 27 Design of the solution
7 Oct 28 Nov 3 Development environment and ancillary tools Oct 29th - PAC2
8 Nov 4 Nov 10 Network setup and certificates infrastructure
9 Nov 11 Nov 17 SSO server implementation and user repository
10 Nov 18 Nov 24 Application server implementation
11 Nov 25 Dec 1 Custom applications development Nov 26th - PAC3
12 Dec 2 Dec 8 Solution integration 
13 Dec 9 Dec 15 Solution testing and benchmarking
14 Dec 16 Dec 22 Results collection
15 Dec 23 Jan 4 Thesis review and Slides presentation Dec 31st - Final thesis
16 Jan 5 Jan 12 Video recording Jan 7th - Video demonstration
The workload is distributed evenly across the semester at a pace of 15 hours per week, tallying
up a total of 225 hours of planned work, which corresponds to the academic estimation of 25
hours per credit for a 9 credits subject.
For the purpose of scheduling, the working weeks have been defined as a set of three weekly
sessions of 5 work hours each.
4.2.1 Gantt diagram
The following Gantt diagram provides a more detailed view of the activities to be executed.
This diagram will be further detailed as the solution design is developed and will serve as a
baseline for monitoring the progress of the project.
In this diagram, the activities purely related to thesis, presentation and video preparation are
not included.
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5  Theoretical Study
5.1 SSO characterization
In an SSO paradigm, a user providing some credentials may be authorized, upon successful
authentication, to access the protected resources. We can see that there are two sets involved
in this process, namely, the credentials provided (one or more) by any user and the resources
authorized (one, more than one, or none at all). Therefore, an SSO operation implies both an
authentication of the user and an authorization to some resources.
In order to characterize the SSO process, we will take the approach of starting by identifying
these two operations with simple mathematical functions and then examine how far this model
can be taken, by expanding the parameters and results of those functions, with regard to the
specification of any given SSO policy.
5.1.1 The authentication process
The authentication process can be modeled by means of what we will call an authentication
function. Indeed, we can see the authentication process as a mathematical function that takes
the credentials provided by the user as inputs and then yields a true/false result as the output
for that user authentication attempt (i.e., telling whether the user has been authenticated or
not). 
Thus, we can define a function A: 
A :(user identifier , credentials)→user authenticated
(u , c)→{0,1}
which takes a user identifier and the provided user credentials and returns a Boolean value to
indicate whether the user authentication was successful or not.
To define a complete SSO policy we must be more specific and enumerate the sets of valid
values for the domain of the function, both for the set of valid user identifiers and the set of
corresponding credentials. Thus, for the user identifier, a syntactically correct e-mail address or
a user-name formation rule may be defined, for example. And for the credentials, some string
of characters following some formation rules are usually specified by the application designers.
These set of definitions are specific to the concrete solution we want to implement in each real
case. 
Multifactor authentication
To achieve an increased level of security, it is a good practice to require more than one kind of
credentials in the same authentication operation. This idea is based on the concept of factors
of authentication16. These factors may be:
• something the user knows: a password, a PIN, etc.
• something possessed only by the user: a card, a USB key, etc.
• something inherent only to the user:  the fingerprint,  the retina image or some
other biometric element
So, for the purpose of enhancing the authentication function, this enhanced case corresponds
to a mathematical function of several variables. Thus, we can redefine the function A as: 
A :(user identifier , factor1 , factor2 ,...)→user authenticated
(u , f 1, f 2,…)→{0,1}
Again, the exact specification of the number and the type of factors is up to the application
designers. This set of information and the validation rules have to be implemented in the actual
authentication component of the SSO solution. 
16 Two factor authentication is an increasing trend especially in cloud based applications. Indeed, applications with 
higher security requirements may rely on requesting three or more authentication factors. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authentication#Authentication_factors for a first discussion. 
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Multilevel authentication
As commented previously, in an SSO solution, having a binary response to an authentication
challenge has the side effect of authorizing the authenticated user to access all the protected
resources in the same authentication server. 
To  deal  with  this  (not  always  desired)  behavior,  we  can  now  enhance  the  authentication
function on the side of the image. Indeed, nothing prevents us from defining a different image
set of values other than the Boolean set {0,1} or {false, true}. 
A first  enhancement can be to define the image of  the authentication function  A in some
subset of the natural numbers: 
A :(user identifier , factor1 , factor2 ,...)→user level
(u , f 1 , f 2 ,…)→{0,1, 2,…}
In this case, the result of the authentication process is a value that can be interpreted as the
user level of authentication, where a 0 would mean "the user is not authenticated" and any
other value meaning "the user is authenticated at level N".
Again, the concrete specification of the image set for a given solution is left to the application
designers so the authentication server can be implemented accordingly. 
5.1.2 The authorization process
At this point, it is important to note that in this definition of the authentication function there is
no information about the authorized resources that a user, with a given authentication level,
may be granted. We need to define which resources are accessible for a given authentication
level.
Having two different function keeps separate the authentication process from the authorization
one and prevents the side effect of having an implicit authorization by getting successfully
authenticated, as commented in section 2.2
Access level
To specify the authorization process to access some protected resources, we can define an
authorization function that yields, for some user and a given authorization level17, the set of
resources accessible by this user. Thus let’s define the function B:
B :(user identifier ,authentication level)→authorized resources
(u , l)→{r1 ,r 2 ,…}
This  function  gets  the  user’s  identifier  and the  user’s  access  level  and returns  the  set  of
resources effectively granted for that user to access at that level. 
The set of potential resources accessible is specific to each solution and must be implemented
by the SSO solution, as well as the exact combination of users, levels and resources authorized.
Notice  that  having  an  authentication  level  of  0  does  not  necessarily  mean  a  null  set  of
resources; some resources could be authorized to any user, even anonymous users for that
access level in some scenarios.
Extra authorization requirements
Under some security requirements, the authorization to access some resources may be further
restricted with extra requirements besides getting an access level. This is the case of out App4,
that requires the user not only having an access level of 40 but also having logged in using a
digital certificate. 
To model these additional parameters let’s expand the function  B to include any additional
restriction in the domain of the function:
B :(user identifier ,acess level , restriction1, restriction2,…)→authorized resources
(u , l , q1,q2,…)→{r 1, r2 ,…}
17 We refer to the result of the authentication function as authentication level, but also as authorization level when 
later used in the authentication function, or just to simplify as the access level. In this model there is a one-to-one 
identification of the authentication level and the authorization level. 
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The number of extra restrictions, again, is up to the designers of the final solution to decide.
Finally, it is important to realize that the complexity of the actual implementation needed to
check  some  of  these  restrictions,  as  well  as  their  potential  variety,  is  what  makes  the
authentication and authorization processes difficult to formalize as a generic framework. 
5.1.3 SSO Policies
For our purposes, we can now model the complete SSO process as a combination of these two
functions, that is: 
P:(user , factor1 , factor2 ,...)→authorized resources
(u ,(u , f 1 , f 2 ,…) ,(q1 , q2 ,…))→{r1 , r2 ,…}
We can define this "combination of functions" as an SSO policy, in the sense that it specifies
for a given user and the provided authentication factors which resources are actually allowed to
be accessed when the authentication of that user is successful. 
Internally, the policy implementation relies on the intermediate "access level" obtained from
the authentication function and, taking into account any other authorization restrictions, yields
the final list of resources.
Therefore, to specify the SSO policy, for any given implementation of an SSO scheme, will need
to define:
• The set of valid user identifiers
• The set of authentication factors allowed for each user
• A table of valid user identifier/credential combinations and their specific validation rules
plus the access level obtained when authenticated
• The set of protected resources 
• A table of resource/access level required to grant permissions18, plus any other extra
restriction imposed to any resource with the corresponding validation rule.
We will use this theoretical model to define the multilevel multifactor SSO policy for the project
in section 6.2.5 (page 28).
5.2 Analysis of Alternative Products
5.2.1 Available alternatives 
SSO server
As discussed in section  2.3.1, many SSO products are available in the market to set up and
operate an SSO solution. Among the open source solutions, the two most prominent, that we
take into consideration, are Apereo CAS and OpenAM.
User repositories
The need for a central repository of user information in a software application has led to a
number of standardized solutions, commonly referred to as directories, and a set of protocols to
interact with these tools. A directory may not only include user information but also may store
information about resources in the network (e.g., shared printers, meeting rooms), etc. 
Several  proprietary  directories  have  been  developed  by  different  vendors,  e.g.  Microsoft
Active Directory,  but on the open source side, the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
LDAP has become the de facto industry standard for directory system access. Also, the recent
trend in cloud computing has increased the offering of SaaS solutions for user identification and
management, like Amazon IAM, for example.
These are the main alternatives for an open source LDAP server:
18 Note that in this model, the user gets "full permissions" for a given resource. To specify more fine-grained 
permissions (e.g only to read, write, etc.) we will need other enhanced models. See Future work on page 52.
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• OpenLDAP19: an open source implementation for the LDAP protocol base directory and
tools.
• 389  Directory  Server20:  another  LDAP  directory  server  for  Linux  machines  with
enterprise-class features.
• ApacheDS21: is  an LDAP and Kerberos server written in Java and maintained at the
Apache Foundation. As a Java application can be easily embedded in Java applications
allowing them to use the LDAP functionality without the need for an external LDAP. It
also features interesting options like stored procedures to help administer the directory
in a more efficient way.
• OpenDJ22: is  another  project  that  started  out  as  a  fork  of  the  Sun  Microsystems
OpenDS. It can be seen as another member of the family of OpenAM. 
To manage the LDAP repositories there is  a  great number of  available client  tools,  among
others:
• JXplore23: a Java tool capable of connecting to an LDAP server to manage the directory
schema and entries (e.g.. groups of user, user information, etc.) 
• Apache Directory Studio24: is  a directory tooling platform particularly designed to
manage the ApacheDS server, written in Java as an Eclipse tool. 
Application servers
In order to run applications in a Java Enterprise Edition (Java2 EE), now know as Jakarta EE25 at
the Eclipse Foundation, an execution environment or container is required. For the applications
needed in the SSO solution to develop, only the servlet(*) specification26 is needed. 
The main open source alternatives for a servlet container are: 
• Apache Tomcat27: a web server and servlet container, developed in Java, widely used
and proven by the Java community.  Alternatively,  when a full  Jakarta EE application
server is needed another option is Apache Geronimo28.
• Eclipse Jetty29: is a servlet container from the Eclipse Foundation especially well suited
to be embedded in other applications which, this way, can deploy a servlet container
without the need of an external server.
• Redhat Wildfly30: formerly known as JBoss AS, is a light-weight but full-featured Jakarta
EE 8 application server, thus providing all the specification capabilities.
Proxy 
The proxy component in the DMZ has the purpose of filtering all the incoming requests from
client devices and forwarding to the corresponding application. 
This component can also be assigned responsibilities for load balancing and fault tolerance.
None of these features are requirements for our SSO solution.
The main open source products for implementing a proxy server are:
• HAproxy31: a  specialized  solution  for  high  availability,  load balancing  and proxying
HTTP request. 
• Apache  httpd: the  well  known  open  source  web  server  that  also  has  proxying
capabilities.  This  option  can  be  interesting  in  deployments  where  Apache  httpd is
already installed or to take advantage of previous training with the product and Java
ecosystem in some corporations.
19 http://www.openldap.org/ 
20 http://www.port389.org/ 
21 http://directory.apache.org/apacheds/ 
22 https://forgerock.github.io/opendj-community-edition/ 
23 http://jxplorer.org/ 
24 http://directory.apache.org/studio/ 
25 https://jakarta.ee/ 
26 https://javaee.github.io/servlet-spec/ 
27 https://tomcat.apache.org/ 
28 http://geronimo.apache.org/ 
29 https://www.eclipse.org/jetty/ 
30 https://wildfly.org/ 
31 www.haproxy.org 
MISTIC - Angel Linares Zapater  22
Multilevel Multifactor Single Sign-On
• Nginx: another  well  known,  very  fast  web  server  that  also  includes  proxy  server
features. 
Digital certificates 
The SSO solution requires digital certificates for two main purposes. The first is to allow users
to provide enhanced credentials in the SSO dialog with respect to the pair user-name/password.
The second is to secure the communications between the user’s client device and the servers
in the internal network (in fact, irrespective of any actual specific application needs, at lease
the password has to be protected when traversing the network!).
The current standard for digital certificates in the web and internet applications is the X.509
specification32. The most common tools for creating digital certificates are:
• OpenSSL33: a suite of tools to work with the SSL/TLS protocols and also to create and
manage digital certificates.
• LibreSSL34: an alternative  project,  forked from OpenSSL,  to  modernize  and further
secure the toolkit.
• Java keytool35:  the Java runtime provides a tool  to manage X.509 certificates and
certificate databases (a.k.a. keystores) for Java applications.
5.2.2 Comparison of alternatives 
SSO servers
Both products, Apereo CAS and OpenAM, provide similar functionality in terms of supported
authentication  and  authorization  protocols,  SSO  features,  encrypted  communications,  etc.
Apereo CAS provides its own protocol (now in version CAS 3.0) but also supports other more
standardized protocols, like OAuth 2.0 or WS Federation, so there is no special reason to select
one over the others. 
We choose Apereo CAS due to what seems a better (or at least broader) documentation and
wider support from stable organizations like Universities that are actually using the product in
real deployments. 
Also, for long term projects, the recurrent changes in leadership and the multiple forks of the
OpenAM code base contrast with the steady level of support for Apereo CAS, either under the
JAAS group or the Apereo Foundation. Moreover, OpenAM is distributed under CDDL(*), a less
common license than Apereo CAS, under Apache 2.0 license. This latter license model has a
broader acceptance than the former, a choice factor that can be decisive in some projects.
User repositories 
In  the  realm  of  open  source  LDAP  servers,  OpenLDAP  is  the  best  known  and  popular
implementation.  Nonetheless,  the set of  tools  to administer  an OpenLDAP server is  mainly
console-based and can pose some challenges to less experienced network administrators than
other choices like ApacheDS. This later solution not only provides the LDAP server but also
accompanies this product with a number of tools, like Apache Directory Studio, which can ease
the maintenance of the directory structure and contents.
In this project, the LDAP server is an intentionally-separated component from the SSO server,
so we can choose a more straightforward (and not Java based) product like OpenLDAP. Should
we had to administer,  especially in a programmatic way, a heavily used and evolving user
directory in a Java environment, ApacheDS could be an appropriate choice.
Application servers
As the SSO server chosen requires a servlet container but does not need a complete Jakarta EE
application server, using Apache Tomcat seems the more common option for this scenario. It is
a well  known product with broad support in the Java community. Indeed, the installation of
Apereo CAS can be implemented either by using an external Tomcat server or by embedding a
Tomcat server in the very same SSO application.
32 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 
33 https://www.openssl.org/ 
34 http://www.libressl.org/  
35 https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/tools/unix/keytool.html 
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Is it  important to note, however,  that Apereo CAS makes no special  assumption about the
servlet container used to run the SSO server. By having selected such an agnostic SSO solution,
a future migration to, say, Wildfly can be undertaken with minimal effort, either migrating from
an external Tomcat or from an embedded one.
Application frameworks
The  Apereo  CAS  product  is,  indeed,  a  Spring  Boot36 Java  application  itself.  Although  the
knowledge of this Java framework is not needed for the deployment of the SSO server, in this
specific project we choose to develop the simple, custom applications also as Spring-based Java
applications.  The  Spring  suite  of  frameworks  will  provide  convenient  tools  to  secure  and
connect  these applications  against  any SSO server,  and obviously  against  the  Apereo CAS
server, being both sides built on top of the Spring libraries. 
Proxies
Among the three proxy solutions seen in the previous section, namely Apache httpd, Nginx and
HAproxy, the latter is a highly specialized solution while the other two are mainly web servers
with additional proxy capabilities. 
Given that we are not interested in testing high-availability and load balancing features in this
specific project, using a web server can be an acceptable solution for the proxy component in
the architecture. And, as the rest of the main components selected before gravitate around the
Java ecosystem and the Apache Foundation solutions, we choose to select Apache httpd as the
proxy in the DMZ37. 
However,  there  is  the  risk  that  in  the  final  implementation  the  requirement  of  end-to-end
encryption could not work completely well  with this product in the DMZ. We can keep the
alternative  of  HAproxy  as  a  backup  solution  to  change  this  component  implementation  if
required by some unforeseen issues while dealing with digital certificates and encrypted traffic.
Digital certificates 
For the creation of X.509 digital certificates we will use the Java keytool when convenient (e.g.,
to secure the Java based Tomcat server), but we will use OpenSSL when a generic certificate is
needed (e.g., providing a certificate to a user to log in some application). 
Using LibreSSL, instead of OpenSSL, is a choice of preferences mainly due to licensing reasons.
For our project, there are no further implications and we will stick to OpenSSL.
36 https://spring.io/projects/spring-boot 
37 In a more complex project, this option also has the benefits of serving the static web pages of the solution from this
server, saving the application server resources for heavier application workloads. Nevertheless, Nginx could also 
perform the same role in the architecture.
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6  Solution Architecture and Design
6.1 Solution Architecture
As hinted in the high-level diagram on page 12, we can identify three main subsystems for the
solution architecture. On the one hand, there are the actual resources to be protected in the
internal  network plus the proxy components in the perimeter network devoted to  isolating
these  resources  from  the  Internet.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  additional,
accompanying  subsystem with  two  new components  that  implement  the  SSO  features  as
specified for the project.
The  following  diagram  represents  a  two-layered  architecture,  where  the  SSO  subsystem
enhances the protected resources in the internal network with the new SSO functionality:
6.1.1 Protected Resources 
Custom Applications
We  identify  the  set  of  protected  resources  in  this  project  as  a  number  of  ad-hoc  client
applications  accessible  from  the  external  network  under  the  SSO  policy  defined  in  the
objectives of the project (p. 13). 
These applications are simple enough just to allow us to test that the security requirements are
met by the final solution. Thus, these simple applications will be only capable of displaying
information  to  identify  the  actual  resource  being  accessed and  providing  some contextual
information about the security applied in the connection.
Obviously, in any real development, the resources in the internal network may vary in every
specific  case.  In  this  project,  however,  we will  use  an application server  to  host  all  these
applications. 
Application server
All  these  "protected"  applications  will  be  running  in  the  same  execution  environment,  an
application server (just a servlet container, indeed). This approach resembles the typical Java-
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Enterprise-based  installation  in  a  corporate  environment  and  allows  sharing  some security
configurations, set in one place, for all the applications. 
Nonetheless, the authentication dialog with the SSO server is expected to be performed by
each application on its own without any intervention from the application server.
Finally, it is important to note that in a real deployment, the internal network could also host
some other servers and services, like database servers, etc. that are not included in this project
due to the simplicity of the applications tested, just focused on the SSO proof of concept.
6.1.2 DMZ
Perimeter Network
Other extra components to account for in the final solution are the proxies in the DMZ, as
required by the proposal. This is an extra layer in the architecture that is not necessarily linked
to the SSO functionality itself. However, it is a usual practice in any corporate environment
accessible from the Internet to implement such type of isolation between the external network
and the internal network. 
Indeed,  having  this  intermediate  component  in  the  architecture  can  pose  some  additional
challenges to the SSO implementation. This is especially relevant when dealing with secure
connections from the applications. which we intend to be secured end-to-end, that is, from the
user’s client device to both the application and SSO servers, and could be affected by the
presence of this intermediate element.
6.1.3 SSO subsystem
Authentication server 
We define a unique, central  user authentication server for all  the resources in the internal
network.  This  centralized  option  provides  a  lot  of  benefits  with  respect  to  other  possible
architectural patterns, like some form of a distributed authentication solution. It also simplifies
the selection of the commercial off the shelf(*) product from the actual market offering for SSO
servers.
Note that the authentication server also requires access to the Internet via the proxies in the
DMZ because the actual authentication dialog with the user’s client (e.g., the user’s browser or
a user’s mobile app) is delegated to the SSO server and not performed by the applications
themselves when a new authentication is required. 
User repository
Although some form of user repository functionality can be implemented by the SSO server
itself,  it is a good practice to separate, at least at an architectural level, this concern (i.e.,
managing the set of users) from the actual SSO functionality (to authenticate the user and
keep  track  of  the  valid  sessions).  In  practice,  indeed,  the  user  management  capabilities
provided by the main available SSO components can be very limited with respect to a proper
user repository product.
By defining a different sub-component for the user repository we gain a lot of flexibility for the
final solution, but at the cost of greater workload to install and configure the new component.
However having a separated component will allow us to further test one of the requirements for
the solution, namely, to let the applications receive some information about the logged in user
from the SSO server.
As a final note, the user repository could also be one of the existing servers in the internal
network  dedicated  to  providing  other  identity  management  services  to  other  network
components. In this architecture, no direct access from the applications to the user repository
is allowed.
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6.2 Solution Design
6.2.1 The Apps
The "secured"  custom applications  are  very simple  applications  that  contain  the  minimum
functionality to test the SSO solution and interact with the authentication server to retrieve and
display some information about the connection made and the privileges granted to the user. 
Basic use cases
A set  of  very  simple  use  cases  for  these  applications  can  be  specified with  the  following
scenarios:
APP Show App information
Actor user
Preconditions the user is logged in the App
Scenario 1. the application shows information about: 
- the user details received from the SSO server
- the available details about the connection 
Alternatives 1.1.a if the user is not logged execute the Log in use case
1.2.a if the user is already logged, according to the SSO server, continue.
Postconditions none
APP Log in
Actor user
Preconditions the user is not logged in the App
Scenario 1. the user enters the required credentials 
2. the SSO server validates the credentials for the user and app
3. the SSO server keeps track of the logged session for this user
Alternatives 2.1.a if the authentication fails the App shows an error message and restarts
Postconditions the user is registered by the SSO server as logged in the App
APP Log out
Actor user
Preconditions the user is logged in the App
Scenario 1. the user selects the logout option
2. the SSO server clears the session
Alternatives
Postconditions the user is no longer registered in the SSO server as logged-in 
It  is important to note that step 3 in the  Log In  use case, "to keep track of the logged in
session", may be implemented in very different ways depending on the SSO server used in the
solution. 
Furthermore, not all  the SSO servers support  a "multiple  log out from all  the applications"
feature when the user logs out from one application. This kind of extra features, far from being
required upfront in a project, are usually left upon the set of features provided by the chosen
SSO product.
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6.2.2 The APP Server 
The application server will be an Apache Tomcat servlet container as selected above (p. Error:
Reference source not found). This choice is appropriate in his scenario where the SSO clients
are Spring applications and can leverage the needed tools from the Java Enterprise ecosystem.
Other different scenarios could be designed to test different kinds of clients against the same
Apereo CAS server, depending on the needs of the final solution. Examples of these clients are
Python applications, Android or iOS apps, etc. 
In any case, the presence of the servlet container should not interfere with the applications
interacting directly with the SSO server.
6.2.3 The CAS Server 
The Apereo CAS server, as an application itself, happens to be a Spring Boot application that,
therefore,  requires  a  servlet  container  where  to  run.  We will  use  a  second Tomcat  servlet
container for the CAS application, in a different machine that the Tomcat server where we will
install the custom client applications38. 
This CAS server will be configured to connect to an external LDAP server. The user repository
will  contain  the  necessary  information  to  authenticate  the  user  and,  in  our  multilevel
authentication scenario, return the authentication level and the corresponding permissions to
access some of the applications depending on the authentication granted.
6.2.4 The LDAP Server
The user repository in this solution is an LDAP server, specifically an OpenLDAP server. 
In a real environment this LDAP server could be already deployed in the network, or as in our
case be deployed only for SSO purposes. Having the LDAP functionality separated from the SSO
server allows this flexibility in implementing an SSO solution.
This  LDAP  server  will  implement  the  user  repository  containing  not  only  the  directory
information but also relevant meta-data about the SSO policy for the set of applications.
6.2.5 The SSO policy 
The specification  of  the  SSO policy  should correspond to  objective  O2.3  of  the  project  as
defined on page 13.
Authentication
We can first define the authentication function, by extension, including the allowed credential
factors for each user:
User credential type authentication level
user10 password level 10
user20 password level 20
user30 password level 30
user31 certificate level 30
user40 password level 40
user41 certificate level 40
For each enumerated user, if the authentication using the credential type shown is valid, the
SSO grants the authentication level indicated in the third column. 
To accept a given credential as valid, we specify that:
38 The option to build the CAS server with a Tomcat server embedded is also possible with Apereo CAS.
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• for passwords, we will require them to match those defined in the corresponding user
directory entry. 
• for certificates, we will require the certificate to be signed by out CA authority(*) and the
user-name included in the certificate to be found in the user directory.
Authorization
We can now specify the authentication level required to access each application, as well as any
other additional restriction imposed in this project (like requiring to log in using some type of
credential). 
App credential type access level 
App1 any level 10
App2 any level 20
App3 any level 30
App4 certificate level 40
We have to keep in mind that the semantics of this "access levels" implies that a user having a
greater authentication level can access applications of a lower level:
The resulting policy
Combining the two tables and the rule of increasing authentication levels we can obtain the
complete SSO policy for all users, provided that a user gets correctly authenticated using the
kind of credentials required. Explicitly: 
User applications authorized after a single sign-on
user10 App1
user20 App1, App2
user30 App1, App2, App3
user31 App1, App2, App3
user40 App1, App2, App3
user41 App1, App2, App3, App4
This SSO policy, for this specific set of users and apps, should match the objectives set initially
for the project. 
Some remarks to be noticed are:
• all users can access App1, if correctly logged in,
• user20 gets access to App1 when logging in to App2 as expected from an SSO scenario,
• user30 and user31, are required to use different credential types but obtain the same
effective authorization39
• user40,  although  getting  an  access  level  of  40,  cannot  access  App4  due  to  the
additional requirement to access using a certificate. However, this user gets access to
the rest of the applications where the access level is sufficient.
In a real context, the complete SSO requirements would probably be given in the form of the
final table and we should have to work backward to find a combination of access levels and
credentials to match the expected policy.
39 A hypothetical user32, able to authenticate either by password OR certificate, can be tested in the final solution. 
Also, requiring some user33 to use a password AND a certificate to log in could be defined.
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6.2.6 Ancillary components
X.509 certificate infrastructure
To secure the communication between components in the solution we will create and distribute
X.509 digital certificates. These certificates will be created either using the Java tools (for Java
applications) or using the OpenSSL suite for more general purposes. 
A certificate to identify each server is created, plus a certificate for the users who need to log in
using this kind of credential to any App that requires such an authentication mechanism.
6.2.7 The network setup
The development environment
All the systems deployed in the SSO solution will be created as virtual machines running on a
development machine on the network 192.168.1.0/24.
This  network  will  act  as  the  "external  network"  of  the  project  and  provide  access  to  the
Internet, via the proxies in the "perimeter network", to the "internal network" servers.
The perimeter and internal networks
To build  the  internal  network  for  the  solution  we  select  a  DNS name (mistic.lan)  for  the
machines and a TCP/IP class C address range (192.168.2.0/24) different from the external
network (192.168.1.0/24).
The following diagram summarizes the network setup for the project:
Figure 5: Network diagram for the project
Notice  the  proxy  machine  proxy.mistic.lan having  two  internet  addresses,  one  for  each
network adapter, and acting therefore as a TCP/IP bridge between both networks.
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7  Solution Implementation
7.1 The development environment
7.1.1 Host environment
The local network at range 192.168.1.x represents the "external network" of the solution, which
provides access to the Internet via the router 192.168.1.1. In this host environment, where the
guest virtual environment will be built, the machine at IP address 192.168.1.11 will act as a
client  device  accessing  the  internal  applications  from  this  external  network  (or  from  the
internet, for that matter). 
This  machine  will  also  work  as  an  application  development  system,  and  as  a  systems
administration machine to create virtual machines, manage and deploy digital certificates, etc.
In this machine, we can set the /etc/hosts file to have the DNS names needed to access the
internal network, which by design is just the PROXY server named www.mistic.lan. 
127.0.0.1 localhost 
192.168.1.200 www.mistic.lan
7.1.2 Virtual environment
To provision the "internal network" machines we create a dedicated Oracle Virtualbox 6.0.x
environment in the development machine. Then we prepare a set of Virtualbox-based virtual
servers in a different network range. 
All  these machines have their  network  adapters  in  the internal  address  range 192.168.2.x
except for the DMZ Proxy that has also an additional, second adapter on the internal network
192.168.1.x, as detailed in The network setup diagram (p. 30). The DMZ Proxy, with interfaces
both in the external and the internal  networks, provides bridging capabilities between both
networks, allowing all the internal network machines to connect to external network clients but
in a supervised, protected way.
Debian 10 virtual machine base image 
We create, for convenience, a virtual machine  server100  (192.168.1.100) with  Debian 10
x64 as a base image to clone later the actual servers for the solution. In this base machine, we
install  the  most  basic  software  packages  with  no  graphical  interface  using  the  Expert
Installation mode (namely, the Standard System Utilities and the SSH server packages from the
Debian  installation  menu).  We  upgrade  the  system  and  install  some  tools  for  better
administration (like Midnight Commander, Emacs, etc.) and change the default configuration of
the SSH server to allow the root user40 to log in:
$ ssh root@192.168.1.100
root@192.168.1.100's password: 
Linux Debian10base 4.19.0-6-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.67-2+deb10u1 (2019-09-20) x86_64
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
root@Debian10base:~#  uname -a
Linux Debian10base 4.19.0-6-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.67-2+deb10u1 (2019-09-20) x86_64 GNU/Linux
This base image has only one network interface, at address 192.168.1.100, which will allow us
to connect to this machine to further customize it after each cloning operation. 
40 Allowing the root user to ssh with user-name and password into a system is considered a bad security practice. We
set this option for easier development and management of this installation. In a production environment, however,
more secure configurations should be considered.
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Development using the internal network machines
In  this  setup,  reaching  the  internal  network  machines  from the  development  machine  for
testing purposes may require to add an additional network route41 in the development PC. To be
able to reach and connect to the internal servers, we can add the additional route:
# sudo ip route add 192.168.2.0/24 via 192.168.1.200
This will allow us to connect from the development machine at IP 192.168.1.11 to the machines
in the range 192.168.2.0/24. To remove the temporary route, just issue the command:
# sudo ip route del 192.168.2.0/24
We can, also, set for temporary development and management purposes some other internal
network machines names in the /etc/hosts file:
192.168.2.200 proxy 
192.168.2.101 app   
192.168.2.111 cas   
192.168.2.112 ldap 
7.1.3 Certificates infrastructure
We create all the needed digital certificates for the servers to authenticate themselves and for
the users who are required to use this kind of credential instead of user-name and password
(see Creating the certificates infrastructure for MISTIC.lan p. 56).
Certificates at the user’s browser
For those users who need to authenticate by presenting a digital certificate, the corresponding
certificate has to be installed in their browsers. In the Mozilla Firefox browser, for example, a
user’s certificate can be imported in the Certificate Manager found in the Preferences/Privacy &
Security/View Certificates section:
41 This type of convenient network configurations, useful at development and deployment time, for example to ssh 
into the internal servers, are not required in the production environment and should be removed and replaced with 
more secure administration alternatives when needed.
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CA root certificate at the user’s browser
The development machine browser does not include the root certificate created for our CA. We
need to install this root certificate if we want to avoid annoying messages from the browser
warning  that  the  servers  visited  in  the  internal  network  are  presenting  certificates  not
recognized by any public CA. In a real environment,  where the final certificates are usually
signed by a globally trusted CA, this warning will not show when the client connects to the
production servers.
Certificates for the PROXY and LDAP server
We create the certificates for  both the PROXY and the LDAP servers (see  Creating MISTIC-
signed X.509 certificates , p. 57). 
After provisioning these two servers we will install the corresponding public and private key pair
in each server.
# scp www.mistic.lan.{crt,key} root@proxy:/srv/www/mistic
root@proxy.mistic.lan's password: 
www.mistic.lan.crt                                                     100% 1996     2.8MB/s   00:00
www.mistic.lan.key                                                     100% 3272     7.4MB/s   00:00
# scp ldap.mistic.lan.{crt,key} root@ldap:/etc/ldap/certs
root@ldap.mistic.lan's password: 
ldap.mistic.lan.crt                                                    100% 1996     2.8MB/s   00:00
ldap.mistic.lan.key                                                    100% 3272     7.4MB/s   00:00
and also will copy the root CA certificate in the Proxy and LDAP servers for later validation of
the certificates received from clients:
# scp ../certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt root@proxy:/srv/www/mistic
root@ldap's password: 
ca.mistic.lan.crt     100% 2126    2.1MB/s   00:00
# scp ../certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt root@ldap:/etc/ldap/certs
root@ldap's password: 
ca.mistic.lan.crt     100% 2126    2.1MB/s   00:00
Certificates for the APP and CAS server
For  the  servers  running  Tomcat  servlet  containers,  namely  APP  and  CAS,  we  create  their
certificates using the Java keytool utility instead of using certificates created with openssl (see
Creating Java keystores for the Tomcat servers p. 58).
These Java keystores will be installed in the /opt/tomcat/conf directory at the corresponding
Tomcat server machine (APP or CAS):
$ scp app.mistic.lan.jks root@app:/opt/tomcat/conf
root@app's password: 
app.mistic.lan.jks                                                     100% 2615     3.9MB/s   00:00
Also, in the case of the CAS server, the keystore for the CA certificate has to be copied:
$ scp ca.mistic.lan.jks root@cas.mistic.lan:/opt/tomcat/conf
root@cas.mistic.lan's password: 
ca.mistic.lan.jks                                                      100% 1834     1.7MB/s   00:00
This  choice  of  tool  to  create  certificates  eases  the  configuration  of  the  Tomcat  servlet
containers. Nevertheless, Tomcat supports the use of other formats of certificate containers like
PKCS#12 via the JSSE facility42.
It is important to note that, using  keytool in this way, implies that these certificates are not
signed by the MISTIC CA authority but self-signed during their creation process.  For internal
connections, there is no need to validate these certificates as issued by the MISTIC CA. In fact,
the communications with external users on the Internet are handled by the proxy server in the
DMZ which checks against the CA, but the internal connections originated at the PROXY and
the APP server can be secured with self-signed certificates.
42 See https://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-8.0-doc/ssl-howto.html 
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7.1.4 Custom applications
The Home Page
To have all the applications grouped for the external users in one place, we create a simple
home web page and install  it in the APP server Tomcat’s ROOT directory just replacing the
default  Tomcat  home  web  page43.  This  way,  users  connecting  to  the  main  URL
https://www.mistic.lan will  get  this  greeting  page (after  convenient  redirection by  the  DMZ
proxy) with the menu of the available applications:
Developing the CAS client applications
According  to  the  project  objectives  for  the  applications  (see  Objectives,  p.  13)  these
applications  must implement some kind of  log in procedure  and session management.  We
create them as very simple Spring Boot applications (see Applications source code, p. 77) and
configure them as CAS clients.
Securing the application as CAS clients
The custom applications require the user to provide a user-name and password or a digital
certificate that will be validated in the single sign-on process. To secure these applications we
add the Spring Security CAS client module44 dependency in the application pom.xml file:
<dependency>
   <groupId>org.jasig.cas.client</groupId>
   <artifactId>cas-client-support-springboot</artifactId>
   <version>3.6.1</version>
</dependency>
Then we add the necessary code to configure45 the connection between the application, as a
CAS client, and the actual CAS server.
Finally, in the application.properties file, we add the entries:
cas.server-url-prefix=https://www.mistic.lan/cas
cas.server-login-url=https://www.mistic.lan/cas/login
cas.client-host-url=https://www.mistic.lan
43 Installing this page in the ROOT directory or in a dedicated subdirectory is a matter of preference. When installed 
as an application in a subdirectory, like home, users will have to use longer URLs: https://www.mistic.lan/home
44 This process sometimes is referred to as casifying the application. 
See https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/3.0.x/reference/cas.html 
45 See https://github.com/apereo/java-cas-client, at section Spring Boot AutoConfiguration.
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These are the URLs that the CAS client will issue and the DMZ proxy will translate into internal
network addresses. 
Note that the destination URLs are formed as seen by the CAS client (i.e. the user’s browser)
from outside the internal network, that is, using the name www.mistic.lan (or 192.168.1.200
IP address) instead of names like proxy.mistic.lan or cas.mistic.lan (or any reference to the
internal 192.168.2.x addresses). From the point of view of any user in the external network, the
internal addresses (or their DNS names) are completely unknown and there is only one point of
interaction, namely, the PROXY server. 
Logging in to the App and the SSO server
When the user connects to an application, the browser presents the web page returned by each
application from the APP server: 
Of course, before accessing this web page, the CAS server takes care of the authentication
process and checks that the user and the credentials provided are correct according to the SSO
policy we have implemented.
Authorizations at the application level
Notice that the application can show some information about the login operation that travels
back from the CAS server (and the LDAP server) to the CAS client, so the app can show (or
work with, as we will see with App4) this information and other attributes retrieved from the
CAS and LDAP servers.  
So, in addition to be able to implement a common mechanism of authentication via an LDAP
server or defining authorization levels via services at the CAS server, we can take advantage of
the information received from the CAS server at the application code to implement even further
conditions for authorizing the use of the application or some of its features. 
In this project, for example, App4 has an extra authorization requirement: this application is
only available for users not only having an access level of 40 but also accessing the application
with X.509 certificate credentials. 
To implement this requirement the App4 code handling the main request can check for the type
of credentials used, as received from the CAS server in the login procedure:
   // Check for a correct credential type 
   if (attributeName.equals("credentialType") && attributeValue.equals("X509CertificateCredential"))
   {
     return "unauthorized"; 
   }
In this case, the access to App4 can be denied when necessary and an  unauthorized.html
page showing a message is returned to automatically redirect the user to the logout page.
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Single sign-off 
Besides being able to log in to an SSO session, the users should be able to log out not only
from one application but also from the SSO session46 and all the logged in applications. This
process is also known as single sign-off or single log out, in analogy to the concept of single
sign-on. 
When the user clicks the logout link in the application page, the CAS server is notified by
calling the URL https://www.mistic.lan/cas/logout (specifically, the user is first redirected to
the  application  logout.html  page  which  redirects  to  this  URL.  See  this  redirection  at  any
logout.html page in the custom applications code, p. 79). 
<meta http-equiv="Refresh" content="0; url=https://www.mistic.lan/cas/logout" />
After closing the SSO session, the CAS server notifies all the applications that were active in the
same SSO session for  them to close their  respective application sessions.  This  behavior  is
defined in the CAS service configuration file, defining a call  to a logout URL, so this call  is
automatically done by the CAS server:
  
  "logoutType" : "FRONT_CHANNEL",
  "logoutUrl" : "https://www.mistic.lan/app3/logout_cas"
The specific  semantics  of  a  single  logout  action,  if  allowed in  a  given set  of  applications,
depends on the requirements for that application. This is why the CAS server "just" notifies of a
"log out" and then the applications must implement the behavior for them specified. 
This feature can be enabled or not in an SSO solution depending on the requirements of the
domain application because the user may experience that behavior as unexpected logouts. We
implemented,  in the CAS services configuration,  that all  the application sessions should be
terminated after one logout in any of them, and we programmed the application controllers to
accept a request to /logout_cas for closing the application session.
    @RequestMapping("/logout_cas")
    public String logout_CAS() 
    {
        session.invalidate();
        
    return "logout";
    }
In this example below, after the user logs out from App3 the server notifies App1 and App2:
46 See https://apereo.github.io/cas/6.1.x/installation/Logout-Single-Signout.html for a discussion.
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7.2 The production environment
For the production environment, we provide and configure the servers in the internal network
that implement the SSO solution.
7.2.1 The DMZ Proxy
Provisioning the server
Using the cloning feature of Virtualbox, we clone the base image server to create a new server
as the Proxy at the DMZ. Once cloned, we reconfigure the machine to meet the corresponding
settings as server proxy.mistic.lan (see Creating a new machine from the base image, p. 54).
Installing the proxy component
We  install  the  Apache httpd  software component  with the proxy modules enabled to allow
access to the internal servers via this machine (see Installing Apache httpd as a reverse proxy,
p. 60). 
Once properly configured, the DMZ proxy will transparently redirect all the external requests to
the address https://www.mistic.lan to the internal servers either at the APP server address
https://app.mistic.lan or at CAS server https://cas.mistic.lan as needed.
7.2.2 The APP server
Provisioning the server
Using again the cloning features, we clone a new machine for the APP server. Once cloned we
reconfigure the machine to meet its corresponding settings as the server app.mistic.lan.
Installing the application server
In this APP server, we first install  Amazon Corretto 11 to have the Java runtime ready (see
Installing Amazon Corretto 11, p.59), and then install a Tomcat server (see  Installing Apache
Tomcat, p.62) where the internal applications will run.
To  test  the  accessing  the  APP server  via  the  Proxy  server  from the external  network,  just
requesting the address of the www.mistic.lan from the client browser we actually obtain the
default Tomcat pages at app.mistic.lan:
We can also check that the connection to the internal  server working as expected passing
through the proxy :
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$ traceroute app.mistic.lan
traceroute to app.mistic.lan (192.168.2.101), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  www.mistic.lan (192.168.1.200)  0.162 ms  0.156 ms  0.155 ms
 2  app.mistic.lan (192.168.2.101)  0.362 ms  0.369 ms  0.371 ms
and that the connections are secured with the MISTIC certificates and the MISTIC CA:
Requesting  "More  Information"  about  the  certificate,  the  user  can  check the  issuer  of  the
certificate and the corresponding Certification Authority:
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Installing the custom applications
In the APP server, we can deploy the custom applications App1, App2, App3 and App4 from
the development environment. 
To do so, we have access to the Tomcat’s Manager application installed by default at the APP
Tomcat server and use this interface to deploy the WAR files of the custom applications to the
APP server:
or we can simply copy the applications into the  /opt/tomcat/webapps directory in the APP
server from the development machine, or even use the Eclipse IDE capabilities to deploy the
WAR after a successful built.
Once all the custom applications are installed and deployed, the Tomcat Manager will show
them up and running at https://www.mistic.lan/manager47:
Finally, we install the Home Page at the  ROOT directory at  /opt/tomcat/webapps (the original
Tomcat  server  home  page  can  be  saved  by  renaming  the  ROOT  directory  as  tomcat,  for
example, so it is still accessible at www.mistic.lan/tomcat). The MISTIC main page can be now
accessed from https://www.mistic.lan.
47 Although useful for development purposes, these administration applications should be removed from external 
access to better secure the installation on production.
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7.2.3 The LDAP server
Provisioning the server
We clone a  new virtual  machine  for  the  LDAP server  and configure  it  with  the  necessary
settings to act  as the  ldap.mistic.lan  server (see  Creating a new machine from the base
image p.54).
Installing the LDAP service
After installing the directory service (see Installing OpenLDAP, p. 65) we are ready to configure
the  MISTIC  organization  scheme  to  set  up  the  right  users  and  their  attributes  for  the
applications. 
Configuring the MISTIC directory 
We define the list of users and organizational units for the MISTIC corporation in an LDIF(*) file
(see  lan.mistic.ldif at LDAP server configuration files, p.75).) with all  the needed directory
entries for users and their attributes. Then we can load the scheme into the LDAP directory
using the command ldapadd. At the LDAP server, with the file available, we run the command: 
root@ldap# ldapadd -v -D cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan -x -w mistic -c -f lan.mistic.ldif
The  ldapadd command connects to the LDAP server as user  admin.mistic.lan and password
mistic  and loads the  contents  of  the file  lan.mistic.ldif.  Then,  we can use  the command
slapcat to check the scheme:
root@ldap# slapcat
dn: dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: top
objectClass: dcObject
objectClass: organization
o: mistic.lan
dc: mistic
structuralObjectClass: organization
entryUUID: 0acbdb7a-b4f4-1039-944d-c9cba5f02b93
creatorsName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
createTimestamp: 20191217083619Z
entryCSN: 20191217083619.365920Z#000000#000#000000
modifiersName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
modifyTimestamp: 20191217083619Z
<...some lines are omitted...>
dn: ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: Users
structuralObjectClass: organizationalUnit
entryUUID: 9c2d9fd2-b4f8-1039-8b53-f74736586912
creatorsName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
createTimestamp: 20191217090901Z
entryCSN: 20191217090901.263213Z#000000#000#000000
modifiersName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
modifyTimestamp: 20191217090901Z
dn: uid=user10,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user10
userPassword:: dXNlcjEw
cn: user10
sn: User 10
employeeType: 10
structuralObjectClass: inetOrgPerson
entryUUID: 9c2fb48e-b4f8-1039-8b54-f74736586912
creatorsName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
createTimestamp: 20191217090901Z
entryCSN: 20191217090901.276851Z#000000#000#000000
modifiersName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
modifyTimestamp: 20191217090901Z
<...the rest of the scheme omitted...>
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At this point, we can also use any graphical tool for browsing an LDAP directory, like JXplorer,
to connect and navigate this new LDAP scheme:
Once connected to the LDAP directory, we can navigate through the MISTIC organization and
users there defined:
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7.2.4 The CAS server
The Apereo CAS software product is, indeed, a Spring Boot application that can be built either
as a WAR file to be deployed in any Tomcat server or as a JAR file with an embedded Tomcat
server.  We  choose  to  build  a  second  server  with  another  Tomcat  installed,  following  the
procedures shown before but with no custom applications installed but just the Apereo CAS
application.
Provisioning the server
After cloning a new virtual machine for the CAS server, we reconfigure it with the appropriate
settings as server cas.mistic.lan (see Creating a new machine from the base image p.54). 
Installing the Tomcat server
In this server, we also install Amazon Corretto 11 (see Installing Amazon Corretto 11, p.59), and
a Tomcat server ready to deploy the CAS WAR file (see Installing Apache Tomcat, p.62). 
Installing the CAS application
We first build the CAS application from the Maven overlay48 and then deploy it in the CAS server
Tomcat container (see Installing Apereo CAS server p. 67) as a normal Java EE application. 
Once the CAS application is installed in the Tomcat servlet container, the service is available for
the applications, via the proxy, at the URL https://www.mistic.lan/cas.
Configuring the CAS application
To completely configure the CAS application to work with the LDAP server to validate users, we
have  to  log  in  to  the  CAS  server  to  review  and  change  the  CAS  configuration  file
at /etc/cas/config/cas.properties. 
We replace the default values with the configuration  needed for the MISTIC project purposes
(see CAS server configuration files, p. 72). 
Also, in this configuration file, there is a reference to another configuration file for the CAS
server logs. As the Tomcat server is run under the tomcat user and this user has no permissions
to write in the default directory /var/log, we choose to change the /etc/cas/config/log4j2.xml
file to instead write the CAS server logs in the directory /opt/tomcat/logs:
48 https://apereo.github.io/cas/6.0.x/installation/WAR-Overlay-Installation.html 
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<Configuration monitorInterval="5" packages="org.apereo.cas.logging">
    <Properties>
        <Property name="baseDir">/opt/tomcat/logs</Property>
 
After these changes are done in the /etc/cas files, we restart the server and accessing to the
URL  https://www.mistic.lan/cas again we can log in with an LDAP user (e.g. using  user10)
and check that the CAS server correctly logs in the user:
Indeed, we can check the attributes received from the CAS server and retrieved from the LDAP
directory, thanks to the configuration defined in the /etc/cas/config/cas.properties file:
These are attributes above are retrieved from the LDAP server and sent to the applications,
after successful authentication. More specifically, we will use the employeeType attribute for
further authorization at the application layer, even for those users correctly authenticated.
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Configuring CAS services 
The  Apereo  CAS  solution  allows  defining  dedicated  configurations  for  the  different  client
applications that can connect to the server, called services in the CAS terminology. We use this
feature  to  implement  the  authorization policy  for  each application depending on the LDAP
attribute  employeeType  retrieved  after  the  user  authentication.  Otherwise,  if  we  try  to
connect from the MISTIC menu from the Java CAS applications we get an authorization error,
even using the right user credentials:
To register the different services (client applications) that the CAS server will go through for
further checks and test after user authentication, we copy the service configuration files from
CAS server  configuration  files,  p73 in  the  /etc/cas/services/  directory,  one  for  each of  our
custom applications.
After restarting the CAS Tomcat server, now we are able to access these applications at the APP
server, after getting authorization from the CAS server. 
Notice the CAS login form customized to show the CAS service being accessed (e,g. App1):
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7.3 Solution integration
7.3.1 Checking the SSO policy implementation
With all the servers installed and configured, now we can test the whole solution by connecting
to the main page and accessing each application using different user credentials. This will test
the correct and complete implementation of the SSO policy for the project as defined in  The
SSO policy (p. 28).
Accessing as a user with user-name and password
Testing as user10
User10  is  required  to  log  in  using  a  valid  user-name  and  password  and  can  only  access
applications at level 10, namely, only App1.
When we connect to the MISTIC main page and click on the App1 link, the browser connects to
the App1 at APP server, but being App1 a CAS client, it connects in turn to the CAS server to
authenticate the user. 
At this point the CAS server prompts the user49 for user-name and password:
If the credentials are correct (once validated against the LDAP directory), the user gets access
and connects to the App1 application:
49 The login page can be customized to use the corporate logo and design for better integration in the corporate 
environment and seamless user experience. We are using the default pages from CAS version 6.1.x.
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However, if the provided credentials are not valid, the CAS server returns an error and prevents
the user from using the application:
If this user10 has logged in correctly, and therefore has initiated a single sign-on session, he or
she could enter immediately in any other application defined at level 10. However, if the user
attempts to access a higher-level application, as defined in the project policy, the CAS server
will  not authorize this access.  For example, if  user10 tries to access App2, the CAS server
responds:
The key point is that the CAS services defined at the CAS server include an "access strategy"
based on certain attributes, in our case "a required" attribute and value for "employeType" as
retrieved from the LDAP server account after a correct authentication. 
Notice that App1 accepts all our specified access levels:
  "accessStrategy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.DefaultRegisteredServiceAccessStrategy",
    "requiredAttributes" : {
      "@class" : "java.util.HashMap",
      "employeeType" : [ "java.util.HashSet", [ "10" "20" "30" "40" ] ]
    }
  }
but App2, and respectively all other applications, only accept higher access levels:
  "accessStrategy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.DefaultRegisteredServiceAccessStrategy",
    "requiredAttributes" : {
      "@class" : "java.util.HashMap",
      "employeeType" : [ "java.util.HashSet", [ "20" "30" "40" ] ]
    }
  }
This effectively restricts user10 to level 10 applications, but correctly provides at the same time
a valid SSO session to use other level 10 applications at the same APP server. 
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Testing as user20
User20 is required to log in using a valid user-name and password but, having been granted a
level access of 20 (by the employeeType attribute at the LDAP directory) in case of correct log,
in, this user will be able to access applications at level 20, that is only App2, but also without a
second log in procedure to applications at lower level, App1 in this case.
Testing as user30
User30 is required to log in using a valid user-name and password. Like user20, this user is able
to  access  App3,  App2  and  App1  with  one  single  log  in  operation  in  any  one  of  these
applications.  The  access  to  the  rest  of  the  applications  is  granted  with  the  SSO  session
obtained in the first correct authentication. 
Accessing as a user with a digital certificate
Testing as user31
User31 is required to authenticate using a digital certificate. When this user access App3, the
CAS server requests the browser to prompt the user to provide a digital certificate (depending
on the browser used, the user can select which certificate to use if more than one):
If a valid certificate is installed in the browser and the user selects the correct one, then the
certificate is  validated as signed by a recognized certification authority.  If  the certificate is
accepted, then the CAS server uses the user-name in the certificate to access the LDAP server
to validate the user and retrieve the rest of the needed attributes. If everything is correct, the
user can access the authorized applications, without entering user-name and password, but
with a valid SSO session available:
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Accessing an app that accepts only digital certificates
Additional requirements for App4
App4 has a different authorization requirement with respect to the other apps that can be
accessed by users either with user-name and password or with digital certificates. For App4,
besides requiring an access level of 40, there exists the extra requirement that states that only
users presenting a digital certificate can access the app regardless of their access level. 
Testing as user40
User40 has been given user-name and password credentials and an access level of 40 in the
user directory.  However, this is not enough to access App4 because no digital  certificate is
presented as a credential in the login procedure. 
Thus, when user40 logs in App4, even though the CAS server grants a valid SSO session to the
user, the application in the APP server detects that the log in credentials were not a digital
certificate and, in our implementation, automatically logs out the user from the application:
Nonetheless, user40 has a valid SSO session and enough access level to enter all the other
applications at lower levels:
Testing as user41
User41, instead, has been given a digital certificate, plus the access level of 40 in the user
directory. This translates in this solution in that user41 can effectively access App4 along with
the rest of applications using the digital certificate as user credentials. 
For example, when user41 clicks the App4 access link, the correct certificate can be provided:
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and having an SSO session granted, this user can also access other applications with no extra
steps:
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8  Project results
8.1 Specific results
Single sign-on
In  this  project,  we have implemented a Single Sign-On solution based on the Apereo CAS
product and custom Java client applications. 
The  CAS  product  offers  a  complete  set  of  features  to  implement  an  SSO  solution,  which
provided us  with the necessary tools  to  implement  the objectives  for  the project  with the
exception of the extra, specific validation for App4 to restrict the users to log only using digital
certificates.
The CAS server is capable of validating users against several sources of user information. We
implemented an OpenLDAP server in this project and we could not only validate the user-name
and password  but  also  perform additional  lookups  in  the  LDAP  database  to  retrieve  more
attributes for the user. This was the case of the "access level", that we implemented using the
existing employeeType field on the inetOrgPerson object class provided by OpenLDAP. 
Single sign-off
One  issue  with  the  SSO  sessions,  sometimes  an  unexpected  behavior  but  other  times  a
requirement for the project, is having the possibility to log out from all the applications, where
a user is logged in, using just a single log out operation. 
Apereo CAS provides a  feature  to  signal  to  all  the  applications  involved in  the  same SSO
session when a logout is performed at one application. Nonetheless, it is still the responsibility
of each application to implement its own sign off procedures when that signal is received.
Multilevel authentication
The SSO scheme, by its very own nature, implies that a user logging in to an application in the
set of protected resources gets immediate access to the rest of the applications. This can be
sometimes regarded as a drawback, and a much more detailed degree of control  over the
authorizations to use some applications may be required. 
We have implemented a multilevel authorization mechanism that allows defining an SSO policy
specifying  which  "access  level"  is  required  to  access  each  application.  This  provides  the
capability to define multiple tiers of authorization for a set of applications.  
Multifactor authentication
Having the possibility to request more than one type of credential in the same log in operation
has become a common trend, especially in web applications on the internet, as a mechanism to
increase the security of these applications and prevent identity impersonation attacks50.
We have implemented in our solution two types of credentials, namely user-name/passwords
and X.505 digital certificates, for user authentication. And we have defined in our SSO policy
when a user should access using which type.
However, we have not explored all the possible cases, like requiring a user to provide both
types  of  credentials  in  the  same  login  operation.  We  have  considered  an  authentication
successful with just one type or the other is valid. 
Nonetheless,  the  current  trend  in  the  industry  is  to  implement  forms  of  multifactor
authentication requiring more than one credential type in the same authentication procedure.
This  is  the  case  of  the  so-called  Two  Factor  Authentication (2FA)  where  a  user,  after  a
successful user-name and password validation. is temporarily provided with a second token, via
SMS for example, to ensure that the user logging in is really the owner of the first credentials.
Other mechanisms are been deployed by the main industry actors,  like replacing the SMS
code51 with a dedicated authentication application installed in the user’s smartphone.
50 See a case of building an impersonation attack on SSO systems at Mayer (2014).
51 The 2FA solution is already regarded as insecure as more and more successful attacks are being discovered. See, 
for example, Grimes (2019)
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Traffic encryption
All the network connections have been secured even in the internal network, with the exception
of the connection from the PROXY to the CAS server. This limitation is imposed by the need to
pass information from the user’s certificate (which is actually validated by the PROXY server) to
the CAS server so it can obtain the user identifier and then perform the needed lookups and
validations on the LDAP server. This security feature is important in the increasing trend to
move corporate  workloads  to  the  cloud,  where  the  "internal  network"  connecting  different
servers should no longer be considered secure, especially when multiple vendors are involved
or in hybrid cloud environments.
8.2 Generic results and remarks
Choosing an SSO server
The choice of Apereo CAS as the base product for the SSO solution has revealed as a good
alternative. However, Apereo  CAS is a fast-moving platform (during the development of the
project we had the opportunity to change from version 6.0.x to 6.1.x, for example).
This implies that implementing a long term SSO solution based on Apereo CAS (or any other
modern product, for that matter) should require provisioning the necessary human resources to
keep the solution not just updated with the latest product patches but to be able to upgrade to
newer releases at the pace the vendor releases more versions and features.
Choosing an LDAP server
Although an  LDAP server  seems a more  mature  and stable  product  in  the  industry,  other
aspects may be considered when choosing the LDAP server. The choice of implementing an
LDAP server just dedicated to the SSO solution or, instead, using an existing user directory
(say, a Microsoft Active Directory in the corporate network) can have architectural and security
implications especially about where the SSO policy is actually defined and by who.
SSO clients dependency
Besides any internally developed applications, other third-party or closed-source applications
could be required to be put under the same SSO policy. As long as not all the features required
to fully implement an SSO policy can be assigned to, and therefore implemented in, the SSO
server (in our case, limiting the access to App4 to digital certificates requires dedicated code in
the Java client),  defining some complex SSO policies can be difficult to implement in some
environments.
We also have seen that even the latest Internet browsers (like Mozilla Firefox) may have some
degree of incompatibility when interacting with the SSO solution (e.g. the TLS v1.3 and Tomcat
post handshake problems). 
Also, not all Internet browsers may behave the same way when dealing with the user’s digital
certificates (Firefox has to be closed and restarted to forget the last certificate used) which
results in an inconsistent experience for lay users and different behaviors among the variety of
user platforms. 
Automation and centralization
Centralizing the point of authentication, and even authorization, in an SSO solution has obvious
implications with respect to the availability of the solution, now with a single point of failure (*).
And despite the initial strategy to concentrate efforts and resources around the SSO solution,
the diversity of potential clients (say, in a BYOD(*) environment) makes almost impossible to
avoid the nuances of dealing with multiple types of client devices. 
Finally,  although  the  automated  deployment  of  clients  and  unattended  installation  of
certificates in final  user machines can ease the workloads of  deploying and maintaining a
complete  SSO  solution,  all  these  extra  requirements  should  be  carefully  considered  when
deciding to move towards an SSO solution in a given organization.
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8.3 Future work
8.3.1 Theoretical approach 
SSO policy specifications
Our very basic theoretical approach to the "SSO policy" has allowed us to design a decoupled
authentication/authorization model based on an indirection52 via the notion of "access level". In
order  for  this  approach  to  evolve  to  a  more  consistent  theoretical  framework,  several
improvements should be developed. 
Nonetheless,  the  advantages  of  having  some  kind  of  formal  specification  for  a  (complex)
authentication and authorization scheme seem promising at least at the degree of being able
to define unambiguously the expected behavior of any actual SSO implementation.
Algebraic properties
The notion of multilevel authorization assumes a tiered scheme; that is, a layer of authorized
resources one on top of another. This is due to the inherent semantics associated with using
natural numbers (and its relation of order) as access levels, thus resulting in increasing (and
including) subsets of authorized resources. Indeed, our specific project relies on an ordered set
of just four elements {10, 20. 30, 40} more than in the whole set of natural numbers. 
Whether this choice of using natural numbers as the image set of the authentication function
reveals as an unnecessary limitation and the model is open to other looser or wider algebraic
structures to gain further flexibility can be explored53. 
Validation expressions
The definition of how the multiple factors of authentication are combined to validate a user’s
login is not clearly specified in this model. For example, in our case, whether two credentials
are required in an OR-type or AND-type combination is not specified. In the case of the default
set up of Apereo CAS, the different authentication solvers are called one after another resulting
in a valid authentication when one method succeeds (thus implementing an OR-type check). 
More sophisticated  definitions for "expressions", using some formal language grammar, could
be added to the model to enhance the specification on how to combine multiple factors of
authentication.
Fine-grained permissions
In this model, once the user gets access to a resource, no additional information about the
allowed use of the resource is specified. An example of such more detailed permissions is to
define whether the user can modify the resource or just read it, or whether some features of a
given application (e.g. access some menu options) are authorized. 
This  kind  of  permission  management  is  usually  left  to  the  application  to  implement54,  but
exploring how to  move some of  these permission assignments to the SSO policy could be
interesting, for example, in the actual trend of publishing open web services under public APIs
to allow accessing internal database, or to provide some form of RBAC(*)-like capabilities to the
model.
SLO specifications
Finally, note that the defined policy provides no formal information about the requirements of
the single sign-off procedure. In this project,  we just  explored one way Apereo CAS allows
implementing a given form of single log out, which signals to all the now-in-use applications
that a logout operation has been performed in some other application.
52 An aphorism attributed to David Wheeler states that "All problems in computer science can be solved by another 
level of indirection". The opposite idea attributed to Jim Grat, says "There is no performance problem that can not 
be solved by eliminating a level of indirection", according to Coulouris (2012) ch 6.1.
53 See Gollmann (2002), ch. 5.8 for the use of lattices. For a historical perspective on first attempts of formalization, 
see Bell (1973) or Demming (1976).
54 This is a present day, common requirement and most modern protocols support it to some extent. See, for 
example, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#page-10 about access tokens in Oauth 2.0 and also 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750 for widely used bearer tokens. 
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8.3.2 Practical implementation 
Load balancing and fault tolerance
The use of  Apache httpd as a proxy server can be improved with load balancing and failure
tolerance capabilities, which should be basic requirements for a complete corporate solution.
Alternatively, in order to deploy these types of features, this proxy/web server component can
be replaced with a specialized proxy component. For example, moving from such a "generic"
product like Apache httpd to a more "specialized" one, like HAproxy, could provide a different
approximation to load balancing and fault tolerance features. 
Service ports selection
In this particular case, we replicated the entries for both ports 443 and 8443 at the PROXY
server configuration, due to the fact that CAS expects the Tomcat server to work on port 8443
while we set up our APP server to work on the standard port 443. 
A careful selection of service ports at design time, obviously conditioned by the availability of
free port numbers in the actual installation should be considered upfront. Or, alternatively, a
redesign  of  the  whole  solution  to  only  use  non-standard,  non-reserved  ports  could  avoid
potential collisions with already-in-use port numbers and could, thus, simplify the connection
configurations between all the implicated servers. 
LDAP schemes
The LDAP scheme used is the very basic  and standard one provided by OpenLDAP. For an
enhanced solution,  a dedicated LDAP scheme with new, specialized attributes for  the SSO
policy could be considered, especially in cases where the user directory to use is an existing
one in the installation or the solution has to be integrated with other proprietary products.
Securing internal communications
On another side, the debate whether all network connections should be encrypted or not in the
"internal network" remains alive in the industry, with a tendency to go for the all-encrypted
approach55.  We tried this  latter  approach but  had to  settle,  though,  to  use  AJP,  a  not-well
documented and non-encrypted protocol56, to connect the APP server to the CAS server to be
able to pass details of the user certificate to the CAS server. Further work on this issue could
provide a  huge improvement  because this  single fact  (having to  rely on AJP)  prevents the
deployment of an "all-encrypted" standardized solution.
Also on the side of the Tomcat servers, we used Java keystores to ease the installation of both
APP  and  CAS  servers.  The  Tomcat’s  Catalina  engine  already  supports  the  use  of  X.509
certificates without the need of using Java based keystores. This choice would be at the price of
making Tomcat dependent of an external suite like OpenSSL installed on the same server, but
would provide the benefits of relying on just one security framework to handle all the digital
certificates. 
Cloud deployment
Finally,  in  an  increasing  tendency  of  the  industry  to  move  to  cloud  based  deployments,
refactoring this solution for a container based infrastructure, like Docker or LXC/LXD, could be a
needed improvement for real deployments of corporate SSO solutions in the cloud. Managing
the set of deployed servers with tools like Kubernetes would be the final approach to a cloud
deployable, production-grade SSO solution. 
55 Insider attacks can be performed by internal employees but also by cloud provider personnel and related 
secondary actors. See a review at Duncan (2015).
56 Some documentation is available at https://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/ajp/ajpv13a.html 
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9  Appendix 1: Installation Procedures 
9.1 Creating a new machine from the base image
Cloning the base image 
Using the cloning feature of Virtualbox create a new machine from the base image server100
while assigning a new MAC address to the network adapter to avoid collisions with other cloned
machines.
Configuring the network adapters
Create a VirtualBox internal network
Then configure the network of the machines in the internal network to use the same name for a
Virtualbox network, e.g. mistic.lan, so they can connect to each other while remaining isolated
from other VMs or the host machine:
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Configuring a second adapter for the proxy
Besides the configuration for the internal network, for the specific case of the DMZ proxy we
need to add a second network adapter connected to the external network via the  VirtualBox
bridged adapter: 
This is not needed for the rest of the servers.
Customizing the cloned servers
To customize  each server,  set  the  correct  host  name (/etc/hostname),  known hosts  in  the
network and interfaces. (see Appendix 2: Source code and configuration files p. 70)
Bridging the networks at the DMZ server
Only in the case of the DMZ Proxy, the network adapters in this server are configured with 2 IP
addresses (192.168.2.200 and 192.168.1.200) to bridge the external and the internal network
(see PROXY server configuration files, p.70):
# ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host 
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: enp0s3: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 
1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:b5:6c:48 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 192.168.2.200/24 brd 192.168.2.255 scope global enp0s3
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:feb5:6c48/64 scope link 
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: enp0s8: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 
1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:09:d0:08 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 192.168.1.200/24 brd 192.168.1.255 scope global enp0s8
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 2a01:c50e:21b2:7700:a00:27ff:fe09:d008/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr 
       valid_lft 1779sec preferred_lft 579sec
    inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe09:d008/64 scope link 
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
Also, depending on the specific version of the operating system, it may be necessary to enable
IP forwarding (setting net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 in the file /etc/sysctl.conf) to allow TCP/IP packets
to pass the bridge between the two network adapters. 
MISTIC - Angel Linares Zapater  55
Multilevel Multifactor Single Sign-On
9.2 Creating the certificates infrastructure for MISTIC.lan
9.2.1 Creating a Certification Authority certificate
Preparing the development machine 
To create and work as a new Certification Authority (CA), the OpenSSL toolkit in the issuing
machine needs to be properly configured. 
As root user, create a directory /root/CA as the working environment for this CA and change the
current directory. Then create a set of needed subdirectories and files:
root@PCALZ11phy:~ # mkdir CA
root@PCALZ11phy:~ # cd CA
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # mkdir certs crl newcerts private
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # chmod 700 private
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # touch index.txt
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # echo 1000 > serial
and modify the OpenSSL configuration file (/etc/ssl/openssl.conf) to use this new configuration:
[ CA_default ]
dir = /root/CA     
certificate    = $dir/certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt
private_key    = $dir/private/ca.mistic.lan.key
Create the private key for the CA
Now, in order to create a Certification Authority, first create the private RSA key:
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # openssl genrsa -out private/ca.mistic.lan.key 4096
Generating RSA private key, 4096 bit long modulus
...........................................................++++
.......................++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # chmod 400 private/ca.mistic.lan.key
Creating the root certificate for the CA
Then create the root certificate for the CA and provide the requested information: 
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # openssl req -new -x509 -extensions v3_ca \
 -sha256 -days 3650 -verbose \
 -key private/ca.mistic.lan.key -out certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt
 
Using configuration from /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:ES
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:Catalunya
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Barcelona
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:MISTIC
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:CA
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:ca.mistic.lan
Email Address []:support@mistic.lan 
For security reasons, is a good practice to create a new intermediate CA which will sign the
final certificates. In this project we will sign the certificates using the root CA, for simplicity.
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9.2.2 Creating MISTIC-signed X.509 certificates 
To create a new certificate (e.g. www.mistic.lan for a server or user31.users.mistic.lan for a
user) signed by the previously created CA, first create a new RSA pair of keys:
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # openssl genrsa -out newcerts/www.mistic.lan.key 2048
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
..................++++
........................................++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # chmod 400 newcerts/www.mistic.lan.key
Then create a certificate signing request (CSR) using the previous keys and enter the data for
the new certificate:
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # openssl req -new -sha256 \
  -key newcerts/www.mistic.lan.key -out newcerts/www.mistic.lan.csr 
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated into your certificate 
request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:ES
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:Catalunya
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Barcelona
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:MISTIC
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:CA
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:www.mistic.lan
Email Address []:support@mistic.lan
Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:  
An optional company name []:
In the case of certificate for  a user in the organization, special  care must be taken in the
organizational information provided in the certificate because this piece of information will be
used by the CAS server to validate the user against the LDAP directory:
root@PCALZ11phy:~/CA # openssl req -new -sha256 \ 
   -key newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.key -out newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.csr
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:ES
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:Catalunya
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Barcelona
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:MISTIC
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:users.mistic.lan
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:user31
Email Address []:user31@users.mistic.lan
Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:
An optional company name []:
Finally, sign these CSR requests using the CA certificate to create the signed certificates:
# openssl x509 -sha256 -days 365 -req -in newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.csr \
  -CA certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt -CAkey private/ca.mistic.lan.key -CAcreateserial \
  -out newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.crt
Signature ok
subject=C = ES, ST = Catalunya, L = Barcelona, O = MISTIC, OU = users.mistic.lan, CN = user31, 
emailAddress = user31@users.mistic.lan
Getting CA Private Key
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Also, in the case of user certificates, to import them later into the user’s browsers it may be
convenient to distribute them in PKCS12 format:
# openssl pkcs12 -export -in newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.crt \
  -inkey newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.key -out newcerts/user31.users.mistic.lan.p12
Enter Export Password:
Verifying - Enter Export Password:
The password included in this PKCS12 file is for security reasons to protect the processes of
importing and exporting the certificate at the user’s machine. 
9.2.3 Creating Java keystores for the Tomcat servers
The Tomcat certificates keystore
The Tomcat servers, both APP and CAS, need a keystore to hold their own certificate when
working with the SSL/TLS connector to work with other machines. 
Create  RSA  keys  and  the  save  them  in  a  Java  keystore  (one  for  each  server,  that  is
app.mistic.lan.jks and cas.mistic.lan.jks) using the Java keytool utility:
$ keytool -genkeypair -alias cas.mistic.lan -keyalg RSA -keystore cas.mistic.lan.jks
Enter keystore password:  
Re-enter new password: 
What is your first and last name?
  [Unknown]:  cas.mistic.lan
What is the name of your organizational unit?
  [Unknown]:  CA    
What is the name of your organization?
  [Unknown]:  MISTIC
What is the name of your City or Locality?
  [Unknown]:  Barcelona
What is the name of your State or Province?
  [Unknown]:  Catalunya                 
What is the two-letter country code for this unit?
  [Unknown]:  ES
Is CN=cas.mistic.lan, OU=CA, O=MISTIC, L=Barcelona, ST=Catalunya, C=ES correct?
  [no]:  yes
We use the password mistic and set the proper organizational values.
The MISTIC CA keystore
Besides the keystore for Tomcat server certificates, we need to create a second keystore to
hold the  trusted certificates,  like  our  CA,  that  will  be  used to  validate  the  received X.509
certificates (e.g., when an application at the APP server connects to the CAS server). 
We import the ca.mistic.lan.crt certificate into a new Java keystore using the Java keytool utility:
$ keytool -import -alias ca.mistic.lan -file ca.mistic.lan.crt -keystore ca.mistic.lan.jks
Enter keystore password:  
Re-enter new password: 
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=support@mistic.lan, CN=ca.mistic.lan, OU=CA, O=MISTIC, L=Barcelona, 
ST=Catalunya, C=ES
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=support@mistic.lan, CN=ca.mistic.lan, OU=CA, O=MISTIC, L=Barcelona, 
ST=Catalunya, C=ES
Serial number: 95a81684197c6a69
Valid from: Fri Nov 08 11:44:03 CET 2019 until: Mon Nov 05 11:44:03 CET 2029
Certificate fingerprints:
 SHA1: 94:4C:81:DF:30:15:64:DC:8D:E6:56:6B:E9:D4:DA:DC:E7:37:28:B7
 SHA256: 
B6:61:37:D1:06:E0:BA:E3:AA:9E:07:A2:05:CB:9B:AF:53:91:E4:D4:E0:73:44:25:DF:FD:6C:AB:5C:70:E9:D3
Signature algorithm name: SHA256withRSA
Subject Public Key Algorithm: 4096-bit RSA key
Version: 3
Extensions: 
#1: ObjectId: 2.5.29.35 Criticality=false
AuthorityKeyIdentifier [
KeyIdentifier [
0000: DF B2 61 40 B7 4E 68 13   F4 85 9D 29 AF 1E 35 EA  ..a@.Nh....)..5.
0010: 6A AB CF DA                                        j...
MISTIC - Angel Linares Zapater  58
Multilevel Multifactor Single Sign-On
]
]
#2: ObjectId: 2.5.29.19 Criticality=true
BasicConstraints:[
  CA:true
  PathLen:2147483647
]
#3: ObjectId: 2.5.29.14 Criticality=false
SubjectKeyIdentifier [
KeyIdentifier [
0000: DF B2 61 40 B7 4E 68 13   F4 85 9D 29 AF 1E 35 EA  ..a@.Nh....)..5.
0010: 6A AB CF DA                                        j...
]
]
Trust this certificate? [no]:  yes
Certificate was added to keystore
We use the password mistic to access this keystore.
9.3 Installing Amazon Corretto 11
Download the package from Amazon.com in the development machine and copy the tarball in
the desired server (e.g. app.mistic.lan or cas.mistic.lan):
$ scp amazon-corretto-11.0.4.11.1-linux-x64.tar.gz root@app:/opt
root@app's password:
amazon-corretto-11.0.4.11.1-linux-x64.tar.gz                           100%  183MB 132.5MB/s   00:01
Now log in this machine and uncompress the tarball in the /opt directory and rename it: 
root@app# cd /opt
root@app:/opt# tar -xvf amazon-corretto-11.0.4.11.1-linux-x64
root@app:/opt# mv amazon-corretto-11.0.4.11.1-linux-x64 corretto-11
Create the file /etc/profile.d/corretto-11.sh with the JAVA_HOME and PATH variables:
root@app# more /etc/profile.d/corretto-11.sh 
export JAVA_HOME=/opt/corretto-11
export PATH=$PATH:$JAVA_HOME/bin
Log out and log in again to the server (or just source the new /etc/profile.d file), to check the
installation of the Java runtime:
root@app# source /etc/profile.d/corretto-11.sh
root@app# java -version
openjdk version "11.0.4" 2019-07-16 LTS
OpenJDK Runtime Environment Corretto-11.0.4.11.1 (build 11.0.4+11-LTS)
OpenJDK 64-Bit Server VM Corretto-11.0.4.11.1 (build 11.0.4+11-LTS, mixed mode)
MISTIC - Angel Linares Zapater  59
Multilevel Multifactor Single Sign-On
9.4 Installing Apache httpd as a reverse proxy
Installing the web server
Install the Apache http webserver package from the Debian repositories: 
root@proxy:~# apt-get install apache2
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree       
Reading state information... Done
The following additional packages will be installed:
  apache2-bin apache2-data apache2-utils libapr1 libaprutil1 libaprutil1-dbd-sqlite3 libaprutil1-
ldap libbrotli1 libcurl4 libjansson4 liblua5.2-0 ssl-cert
Suggested packages:
  apache2-doc apache2-suexec-pristine | apache2-suexec-custom www-browser openssl-blacklist
The following NEW packages will be installed:
  apache2 apache2-bin apache2-data apache2-utils libapr1 libaprutil1 libaprutil1-dbd-sqlite3 
libaprutil1-ldap libbrotli1 libcurl4 libjansson4 liblua5.2-0 ssl-cert
0 upgraded, 13 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
Need to get 2,959 kB of archives.
After this operation, 9,663 kB of additional disk space will be used.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n]
Test the webserver by connecting to  http://www.mistic.lan from the development machine
browser:
Enabling SSL/TLS 
Enable the Apache httpd SSL modules:
root@proxy:~# a2enmod ssl
Considering dependency setenvif for ssl:
Module setenvif already enabled
Considering dependency mime for ssl:
Module mime already enabled
Considering dependency socache_shmcb for ssl:
Enabling module socache_shmcb.
Enabling module ssl.
See /usr/share/doc/apache2/README.Debian.gz on how to configure SSL and create self-signed 
certificates.
In  this  module,  disable  TLSv1.3  because  some  common  browsers  like  Firefox  do  not  yet
implement post-handsake authentication57. This would prevent a user entering an application
that does not require a certificate to be able to provide a certificate in the same browser
session (the user should close the browser application and start again with a clean session). In
the file /etc/apache/mods-enabled/ssl.conf add an exception for protocol TLS v1.3:
        #   The protocols to enable.
        #   Available values: all, SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2
        #   SSL v2  is no longer supported
        SSLProtocol all -SSLv3 -TLSv1.3
57 See, for example, https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=62975 
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Setting up the reverse proxy
Creating a website configuration
For the proxy server to perform the expected redirections, create a website configuration file
/etc/apache2/sites-available/www.mistic.lan.conf with  the  contents  shown  at  PROXY
server configuration files, p. 70. This file defines a new website at the webserver, but note that
this website only acts only as a proxy and does not serve any HTML document. 
In this configuration all HTTP requests (port 80) are redirected to HTTPS (port 443):
<VirtualHost *:80>
     ServerName www.mistic.lan
     Redirect / https://www.mistic.lan/
</VirtualHost>
and a VirtualHost for port 8443 is created58 just to redirect all connections to port 443. This is
because the CAS server expects the work on the former but our APP server works on the latter. 
Note that all  proxy redirections to the APP  server are done under HTTPS protocol59 and are
redirected to app.mistic.lan, except the URLs starting with /cas that are derived to the CAS
application at cas.mistic.lan/cas using the AJP protocol at port 8009:
     ProxyPassReverse /cas ajp://cas.mistic.lan:8009/cas
     ProxyPassReverse /    https://app.mistic.lan:8443/
Finally, create the home directory for the website at  /srv/www/mistic with permissions for the
Apache httpd user to write there the website logs: 
root@proxy:~# mkdir -p /srv/www/mistic/logs
root@proxy:~# chown www-data /srv/www/mistic
Install also there, with the proper restricted permissions, the certificates created for both the
Proxy server and CA authority as the files indicated in the SSL configuration section for the
website:
     SSLEngine on
     SSLCertificateFile    /srv/www/mistic/www.mistic.lan.crt
     SSLCertificateKeyFile /srv/www/mistic/www.mistic.lan.key
     SSLCACertificateFile  /srv/www/mistic/ca.mistic.lan.crt
Configuring the reverse proxy
For the webserver to act as a reverse proxy, enable the  Apache proxy_httpd  and  proxy_ajp
modules and restart the web server :
root@proxy:~# a2enmod proxy_http
Considering dependency proxy for proxy_http:
Enabling module proxy.
Enabling module proxy_http.
root@proxy:~# a2enmod proxy_ajp
Considering dependency proxy for proxy_ajp:
Module proxy already enabled
Enabling module proxy_ajp.
root@proxy:~# systemctl apache2 restart
The first module enables the reverse proxy for HTTP/HTTPS connections while the second one
enables  the  special  Apache  protocol  AJP  used  to  be  able  to  pass  to  the  CAS  server  the
certificates received from the client. 
Test again the web server with TLS/SSL by connecting to https://www.mistic.lan (instead of
http://) from the development machine. 
58 Listening to this port 8443 has to be enabled in the /etc/apache/ports.conf file.
59 Although in a protected environment the connections inside the internal network may be considered secure, there 
is no warranty that any server will not moved in the future to another location (like a cloud base data center) that 
could then require to configure a secured connection.
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9.5 Installing Apache Tomcat
Installing Apache Tomcat 
Download the package from apache.org at the development machine and copy the tarball in
the desired machine:
$ scp apache-tomcat-9.0.26.tar.gz root@app:/opt
root@app's password: 
apache-tomcat-9.0.26.tar.gz                                            100%   12MB 228.0MB/s   00:00
Uncompress the tarball at the remote server and rename the new extracted directory. 
root@app# cd /opt
root@app# tar -xvf apache-tomcat-9.0.26.tar.gz
root@app# mv apache-tomcat-9.0.26 tomcat
Create a dedicated user for the Tomcat server and change the owner of the Tomcat directory:
root@app# useradd -r -m -U -d /opt/tomcat -s /bin/false tomcat
root@app# chown -R tomcat tomcat
Create a systemd unit file as shown below and then enable and start the new service:
root@app# more /etc/systemd/system/tomcat.service
[Unit]
Description=Tomcat 9 Servlet Container
After=network.target
[Service]
Type=forking
User=tomcat
Environment="JAVA_HOME=/opt/corretto-11"
Environment="JAVA_OPTS=-Djava.security.egd=file:///dev/urandom"
Environment="CATALINA_BASE=/opt/tomcat"
Environment="CATALINA_HOME=/opt/tomcat"
Environment="CATALINA_PID=/opt/tomcat/temp/tomcat.pid"
Environment="CATALINA_OPTS=-Xms512M -Xmx1024M -server"
ExecStart=/opt/tomcat/bin/startup.sh
ExecStop=/opt/tomcat/bin/shutdown.sh
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
root@app# systemctl enable tomcat.service
Created symlink /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/tomcat.service → 
/etc/systemd/system/tomcat.service.
root@app# systemctl start tomcat
root@app# systemctl status tomcat
● tomcat.service - Tomcat 9 Servlet Container
   Loaded: loaded (/etc/systemd/system/tomcat.service; disabled; vendor preset: enabled)
   Active: active (running) since Wed 2019-10-23 10:08:54 UTC; 4min 40s ago
 Main PID: 1202 (java)
    Tasks: 48 (limit: 4701)
   Memory: 165.1M
   CGroup: /system.slice/tomcat.service
           └─1202 /opt/corretto-11/bin/java -Djava.util.logging.config.file=/opt/tomcat-
9/conf/logging.properties -Djava.util.logging.manager=org.apache.juli.ClassLoaderLogManager 
-Djava.security.egd=file:///dev
Oct 23 10:08:54 app.mistic.lan systemd[1]: Starting Tomcat 9 Servlet Container...
Oct 23 10:08:54 app.mistic.lan startup.sh[1195]: Tomcat started.
Oct 23 10:08:54 app.mistic.lan systemd[1]: Started Tomcat 9 Servlet Container.
The server now should respond to direct requests at port 8080:
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Configuring Apache Tomcat for remote administration
Optionally, for development purposes but also to be able to administer the application server
remotely,  modify the configuration file  /opt/tomcat/conf/tomcat-users.xml to provide Tomcat
administration roles to a new user, for example named admin with password tomcat:
<role rolename="admin-gui,manager-gui"/>
<user username="admin" password="tomcat" roles="admin-gui,manager-gui"/>
and also modify the file  /opt/tomcat/webapps/manager/META-INF/context.xml to allow remote
access from external network machines addresses:
Context antiResourceLocking="false" privileged="true" >
  <Valve className="org.apache.catalina.valves.RemoteAddrValve"
         allow="192.168.\d+.\d+|127\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+|::1|0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1" />
Restart the Tomcat service now to be able to administer the server remotely at the address
http://192.168.2.101:8080/manager: 
# systemctl restart tomcat
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Configuring Apache Tomcat for SSL connections
Configuring APP server’s Apache Tomcat for SSL
Log in to the Tomcat server and enable the Catalina connector for port 8443, by setting the
following entry in the file /opt/tomcat/conf/server.xml in the Connector section, to point to
the right certificate keystores:
                                                                                                    
    <Connector port="8443" protocol="org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11NioProtocol"
               maxThreads="150" scheme="https" secure="true" SSLEnabled="true"
               keystoreFile="conf/app.mistic.lan.jks" keystorePass="mistic"
               clientAuth="want" sslProtocol="TLS" />    
or. for the CAS server, add also the trusted keystore for the CA certificate:
                                                                                                    
    <Connector port="8443" protocol="org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11NioProtocol"
               maxThreads="150" scheme="https" secure="true" SSLEnabled="true"
               keystoreFile="conf/cas.mistic.lan.jks" keystorePass="mistic"
               truststoreFile="conf/ca.mistic.lan.jks" truststorePass="mistic"
               clientAuth="want" sslProtocol="TLS" />    
and restart the Tomcat server to allow SSL connections: 
# systemctl restart tomcat
Now, for example, the APP server is accessible via the proxy at the URL https://www.mistic.lan:
The DMZ proxy redirects the connection from the user’s browser to  www.mistic.lan to the
internal APP server at app.mistic.lan, while using a secure connection with certificates signed
by the MISTIC CA authority.
Adding the CA root certificate to the Java Runtime keystore at the CAS server
In addition to configuring the Tomcat container in the CAS server to be able to receive TLS/SSL
connections from the APP server, the CAS server itself connects to the LDAP server. To allow
encrypted connections when the CAS server is a TLS/SSL client, import the MISTIC CA root
certificate  into  the  global  Java  Amazon  Corretto  11  keystore  (located  at  /opt/corretto-
11/lib/security/cacerts with a standard password  changeit) to be able to validate any other
certificate signed by our CA authority:
root@cas:/etc/cas# keytool -import -alias ca.mistic.lan -file ca.mistic.lan.crt -cacerts
Enter keystore password:  
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=support@mistic.lan, CN=ca.mistic.lan, OU=CA, O=MISTIC, L=Barcelona, 
ST=Catalunya, C=ES
MISTIC - Angel Linares Zapater  64
Multilevel Multifactor Single Sign-On
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=support@mistic.lan, CN=ca.mistic.lan, OU=CA, O=MISTIC, L=Barcelona, 
ST=Catalunya, C=ES
Serial number: 95a81684197c6a69
Valid from: Fri Nov 08 10:44:03 UTC 2019 until: Mon Nov 05 10:44:03 UTC 2029
Certificate fingerprints:
 SHA1: 94:4C:81:DF:30:15:64:DC:8D:E6:56:6B:E9:D4:DA:DC:E7:37:28:B7
 SHA256: 
B6:61:37:D1:06:E0:BA:E3:AA:9E:07:A2:05:CB:9B:AF:53:91:E4:D4:E0:73:44:25:DF:FD:6C:AB:5C:70:E9:D3
Signature algorithm name: SHA256withRSA
Subject Public Key Algorithm: 4096-bit RSA key
Version: 3
Extensions: 
#1: ObjectId: 2.5.29.35 Criticality=false
AuthorityKeyIdentifier [
KeyIdentifier [
0000: DF B2 61 40 B7 4E 68 13   F4 85 9D 29 AF 1E 35 EA  ..a@.Nh....)..5.
0010: 6A AB CF DA                                        j...
]
]
#2: ObjectId: 2.5.29.19 Criticality=true
BasicConstraints:[
  CA:true
  PathLen:2147483647
]
#3: ObjectId: 2.5.29.14 Criticality=false
SubjectKeyIdentifier [
KeyIdentifier [
0000: DF B2 61 40 B7 4E 68 13   F4 85 9D 29 AF 1E 35 EA  ..a@.Nh....)..5.
0010: 6A AB CF DA                                        j...
]
]
Trust this certificate? [no]:  yes
Certificate was added to keystore
9.6 Installing OpenLDAP
Installing the directory service
Install the OpenLDAP packages for the server and utilities from the Debian repositories60:
root@ldap# apt-get install slapd ldap-utils
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree       
Reading state information... Done
The following additional packages will be installed:
  libodbc1
Suggested packages:
  libmyodbc odbc-postgresql tdsodbc unixodbc-bin ldap-utils libsasl2-modules-gssapi-mit | libsasl2-
modules-gssapi-heimdal
The following NEW packages will be installed:
  libodbc1 slapd
0 upgraded, 2 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
Need to get 1,659 kB of archives.
After this operation, 16.7 MB of additional disk space will be used.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n]
Enter the password mistic for the LDAP administrator user:
60 To use the Debian repositories from the Internet, a temporary network adapter can be configured bridged to the 
external network just to download and install the software and then can be removed from this server.
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Once the installation completes:
Get:1 http://ftp.cica.es/debian buster/main amd64 libodbc1 amd64 2.3.6-0.1 [223 kB]
Get:2 http://ftp.cica.es/debian buster/main amd64 slapd amd64 2.4.47+dfsg-3+deb10u1 [1,436 kB]
Fetched 1,659 kB in 1s (2,657 kB/s)
Preconfiguring packages ...
Selecting previously unselected package libodbc1:amd64.
(Reading database ... 33644 files and directories currently installed.)
Preparing to unpack .../libodbc1_2.3.6-0.1_amd64.deb ...
Unpacking libodbc1:amd64 (2.3.6-0.1) ...
Selecting previously unselected package slapd.
Preparing to unpack .../slapd_2.4.47+dfsg-3+deb10u1_amd64.deb ...
Unpacking slapd (2.4.47+dfsg-3+deb10u1) ...
Setting up libodbc1:amd64 (2.3.6-0.1) ...
Setting up slapd (2.4.47+dfsg-3+deb10u1) ...
  Creating new user openldap... done.
  Creating initial configuration... done.
  Creating LDAP directory... done.
Processing triggers for systemd (241-7~deb10u1) ...
Processing triggers for man-db (2.8.5-2) ...
Processing triggers for libc-bin (2.28-10) ...
check that the service is installed and running:
# systemctl status slapd
● slapd.service - LSB: OpenLDAP standalone server (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol)
   Loaded: loaded (/etc/init.d/slapd; generated)
   Active: active (running) since Wed 2019-10-16 07:56:42 UTC; 3min 35s ago
     Docs: man:systemd-sysv-generator(8)
    Tasks: 3 (limit: 4701)
   Memory: 3.5M
   CGroup: /system.slice/slapd.service
           └─1933 /usr/sbin/slapd -h ldap:/// ldapi:/// -g openldap -u openldap -F /etc/ldap/slapd.d
Now that  LDAP is  installed,  use  the  Debian  command  dpkg-reconfigure  to  initialize  a  new
scheme and replace the default one:
# dpkg-reconfigure slapd
Entering the values for the project when prompted, create a simple organization  mistic.lan
and a group of users user.mistic.lan. This organization is just for testing purposes. 
Finally. test the LDAP directory with the slapcat command: 
# slapcat
dn: dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: top
objectClass: dcObject
objectClass: organization
o: MISTIC
dc: mistic
structuralObjectClass: organization
entryUUID: 26a3f3ce-a094-1039-8579-fddcb6c02024
creatorsName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
createTimestamp: 20191121101931Z
entryCSN: 20191121101931.138999Z#000000#000#000000
modifiersName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
modifyTimestamp: 20191121101931Z
dn: ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: application users
ou: users
structuralObjectClass: organizationalUnit
entryUUID: c9dae318-a094-1039-85a2-e916b965a1a1
creatorsName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
createTimestamp: 20191121102404Z
entryCSN: 20191121102404.967672Z#000000#000#000000
modifiersName: cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan
modifyTimestamp: 20191121102404Z
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Enabling TLS/SSL connections for the LDAP server
To allow the LDAP server to establish TLS/SSL connections with LDAP clients (the CAS server in
this  case),  copy  the  certificates  created  for  the  LDAP  server  and  also  the  CA  authority
certificate at the /etc/ldap/certs directory. 
Then  modify  the  LDAP  server  configuration  by  creating  an  LDIF  file  (e.g.
/etc/ldap/sdap.d/sldapssl.ldif) with the values for these certificates locations: 
dn: cn=config
changetype: modify
replace: olcTLSCertificateKeyFile
olcTLSCertificateKeyFile: /etc/ldap/certs/ldap.mistic.lan.key
-
replace: olcTLSCertificateFile
olcTLSCertificateFile: /etc/ldap/certs/ldap.mistic.lan.crt
-
replace: olcTLSCACertificateFile
olcTLSCACertificateFile: /etc/ldap/certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt
and issue the command ldapmodify to load this new configuration to the LDAP server:
root@ldap:/etc/ldap/slap.d# ldapmodify -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f slapdssl.ldif 
SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
SASL SSF: 0
modifying entry "cn=config"
Now the LDAP server has its own MISTIC certificate installed to handle TLS/SSL connections
plus the MISTIC CA certificate to validate the certificate received from the CAS server when
acting as an LDAP client.
To enable the LDAP protocols to be used by the service, edit the file  /etc/default/sldapd to
allow connections via the secured channel:
# slapd normally serves ldap only on all TCP-ports 389. slapd can also                              
# service requests on TCP-port 636 (ldaps) and requests via unix                                    
# sockets.                                                                                          
# Example usage:                                                                                    
# SLAPD_SERVICES="ldap://127.0.0.1:389/ ldaps:/// ldapi:///"                                        
SLAPD_SERVICES="ldaps:/// ldap:/// ldapi:///"
and restart the service and check the the LDAP service is listening to port 636 (ldaps://) as well
as port 398 (ldap://):
root@ldap# systemctl restart sladp
root@ldap# ss -ntl4
State                 Recv-Q         Send-Q       Local Address:Port        Peer Address:Port       
LISTEN                0              128          0.0.0.0:22                0.0.0.0:*               
LISTEN                0              20           127.0.0.1:25              0.0.0.0:*               
LISTEN                0              128          0.0.0.0:636               0.0.0.0:*               
LISTEN                0              128          0.0.0.0:389               0.0.0.0:*               
9.7 Installing Apereo CAS server
Building and installing the CAS service
Download the CAS overlay template from the GitHub repository for Apereo projects61 and unzip
the ZIP file at the development machine: 
$ unzip cas-overlay-template-6.1.zip 
Archive:  cas-overlay-template-6.1.zip
83e0044cc91250393462396f665c67ef25566c0d
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/.gitattributes  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/.github/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/.github/FUNDING.yml  
61 https://github.com/apereo/cas-overlay-template/tree/6.  1  
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  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/.gitignore  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/.mergify.yml  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/.travis.yml  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/Dockerfile  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/LICENSE.txt  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/README.md  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/build.gradle  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/docker-build.sh  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/docker-compose.yml  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/docker-push.sh  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/docker-run.sh  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/config/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/config/cas.properties  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/config/log4j2.xml  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/saml/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/saml/.gitkeep  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/services/
 extracting: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/services/.donotdel  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/etc/cas/thekeystore  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle.properties  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/dockerjib.gradle  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/springboot.gradle  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/tasks.gradle  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/wrapper/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradlew  
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/gradlew.bat  
 extracting: cas-overlay-template-6.1/settings.gradle  
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/src/
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/src/main/
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/src/main/jib/
   creating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/src/main/jib/docker/
  inflating: cas-overlay-template-6.1/src/main/jib/docker/entrypoint.sh  
Then change into the new extracted directory to build the actual WAR to deploy:
$ cd /opt/cas-overlay-template-6.1
First, add the needed dependencies in the build.gradle file, to be able to:
• load CAS services from a JSON configuration file,
• add support for LDAP authentication,
• add support for X.509 authentication
dependencies {
    // Other CAS dependencies/modules may be listed here...
    compile "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-json-service-registry:${casServerVersion}"
    compile "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-ldap:${project.'cas.version'}"
    compile "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-x509-webflow:${project.'cas.version'}"
}
Once the template is  configured for  the SSO project,  issue the  gradlew build  command to
compile and build the WAR file (the gradle tool will be installed if not available):
$ gradlew build
Starting a Gradle Daemon (subsequent builds will be faster)
> Task :compileJava NO-SOURCE
> Task :processResources NO-SOURCE
> Task :classes UP-TO-DATE
> Task :extractCasBootWarOverlay UP-TO-DATE
> Task :bootWar UP-TO-DATE
> Task :war SKIPPED
> Task :assemble UP-TO-DATE
> Task :compileTestJava NO-SOURCE
> Task :processTestResources NO-SOURCE
> Task :testClasses UP-TO-DATE
> Task :test NO-SOURCE
> Task :check UP-TO-DATE
> Task :build UP-TO-DATE
Deprecated Gradle features were used in this build, making it incompatible with Gradle 6.0.
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Use '--warning-mode all' to show the individual deprecation warnings.
See https://docs.gradle.org/5.6.3/userguide/command_line_interface.html#sec:command_line_warnings
BUILD SUCCESSFUL in 1s
2 actionable tasks: 2 up-to-date
Now copy the default CAS configuration folder etc/cas in the CAS server /etc directory.
$ scp -r etc/cas root@cas:/etc
root@cas's password: 
log4j2.xml                                                             100% 7217     4.6MB/s   00:00
cas.properties                                                         100%  162   144.0KB/s   00:00
.gitkeep                                                               100%   71    65.7KB/s   00:00
.donotdel                                                              100%    0     0.0KB/s   00:00
thekeystore                                                            100% 2266     1.8MB/s   00:00
and, finally, deploy the WAR file named cas.war in the directory  build/libs.  This is the CAS
application  ready to be deployed to the CAS Tomcat server as a regular application. Simply
copy the WAR file in the /opt/tomcat/webapps directory in the CAS server:
$ scp build/libs/cas.war root@cas:/opt/tomcat/webapps
root@cas.mistic.lan's password: 
cas.war                                                               100%   90MB 160.3MB/s   00:00 
and the application will be automatically deployed and run by the Tomcat server. 
Testing the CAS server
Test the CAS application running in this Tomcat server and check that is accepting connections
via the DMZ proxy from the URL https://www  .mistic.lan/cas. Upon receiving the connection
the CAS application redirects the user to the default login page:
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10  Appendix 2: Source code and configuration files
10.1 PROXY server configuration files
/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1       localhost
192.168.1.200   www.mistic.lan          www
192.168.2.101   app.mistic.lan          app
192.168.2.111   cas.mistic.lan          cas
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts                                          
::1     localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
/etc/network/interfaces
# This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
# and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).
source /etc/network/interfaces.d/*
# The loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback
# The primary network interface
allow-hotplug enp0s3
iface enp0s3 inet static
address 192.168.2.200/24
allow-hotplug enp0s8
iface enp0s8 inet static
address 192.168.1.200/24
gateway 192.168.1.1
# dns-* options are implemented by the resolvconf package, if installed
dns-nameservers 1.1.1.1
dns-search mistic.lan
/etc/apache2/sites-available/www.mistic.lan.conf
<VirtualHost *:80>
     ServerName www.mistic.lan 
     Redirect / https://www.mistic.lan/
</VirtualHost>
<VirtualHost *:8443>
     ServerName www.mistic.lan
     SSLEngine on
     SSLCertificateFile /srv/www/mistic/www.mistic.lan.crt
     SSLCertificateKeyFile /srv/www/mistic/www.mistic.lan.key
     SSLCACertificateFile /srv/www/mistic/ca.mistic.lan.crt
     <Location /app3>
       SSLVerifyClient      optional
       SSLVerifyDepth       2
       SSLOptions +ExportCertData
     </Location>
     <Location /app4>
       SSLVerifyClient      optional
       SSLVerifyDepth       2
       SSLOptions +ExportCertData
     </Location>
     Redirect / https://www.mistic.lan/
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</VirtualHost>
<VirtualHost *:443>
     ServerName www.mistic.lan
     DocumentRoot /srv/www/mistic/html/
     SSLEngine on
     SSLCertificateFile /srv/www/mistic/www.mistic.lan.crt
     SSLCertificateKeyFile /srv/www/mistic/www.mistic.lan.key
     SSLCACertificateFile /srv/www/mistic/ca.mistic.lan.crt
     <Location /app3>
       SSLVerifyClient      optional
       SSLVerifyDepth       2
       SSLOptions +ExportCertData
     </Location>
     <Location /app4>
       SSLVerifyClient      optional
       SSLVerifyDepth       2
       SSLOptions +ExportCertData
     </Location>
     SSLProxyEngine on
     ProxyPass        /cas ajp://cas.mistic.lan:8009/cas
     ProxyPassReverse /cas ajp://cas.mistic.lan:8009/cas
     
     ProxyPass        / https://app.mistic.lan:8443/
     ProxyPassReverse / https://app.mistic.lan:8443/
     
     ErrorLog /srv/www/mistic/logs/error.log
     CustomLog /srv/www/mistic/logs/access.log combined
</VirtualHost>
/etc/apache/ports.conf
# If you just change the port or add more ports here, you will likely also                          
# have to change the VirtualHost statement in                                                       
# /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default.conf                                                       
Listen 80
<IfModule ssl_module>
        Listen 443
        Listen 8443
</IfModule>
<IfModule mod_gnutls.c>
        Listen 443
        Listen 8443
</IfModule>
# vim: syntax=apache ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 sr noet                                                        
10.2 APP server configuration files
/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1       localhost
192.168.2.101   app.mistic.lan  
192.168.1.200   www.mistic.lan  
192.168.2.111   cas.mistic.lan
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts                                          
::1     localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
MISTIC - Angel Linares Zapater  71
Multilevel Multifactor Single Sign-On
/etc/network/interfaces
# This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
# and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).
source /etc/network/interfaces.d/*
# The loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback
# The primary network interface
allow-hotplug enp0s3
iface enp0s3 inet static
        address 192.168.2.101/24
        gateway 192.168.2.200
10.3 CAS server configuration files
/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1  localhost
192.168.2.101   app.mistic.lan          app
192.168.2.111   cas.mistic.lan          cas
192.168.2.200   proxy.mistic.lan        proxy
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1     localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback 
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
/etc/network/interfaces
# This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
# and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).
source /etc/network/interfaces.d/*
# The loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback
# The primary network interface
allow-hotplug enp0s3
iface enp0s3 inet static
        address 192.168.2.111/24
        gateway 192.168.2.200
/etc/cas/config/cas.properties
#========================================
# CAS Server 
#========================================
cas.server.name=https://www.mistic.lan
cas.server.prefix=${cas.server.name}/cas
cas.host.name=cas.mistic.lan
#========================================
# Logging 
#========================================
logging.config=file:/etc/cas/config/log4j2.xml
#========================================
# Service Registry
#========================================
#cas.serviceRegistry.initFromJson=true
cas.serviceRegistry.json.location=file:///etc/cas/services
cas.serviceRegistry.watcherEnabled=true
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#========================================
# Authentication 
#========================================
#----------------------------------------
# Static authentication
#----------------------------------------
# Disable static authentication
cas.authn.accept.users=
#----------------------------------------
# X.509 Authentication
#----------------------------------------
cas.authn.x509.principalType=SUBJECT
cas.authn.x509.principalDescriptor=$CN
#----------------------------------------
# LDAP Authentication
#----------------------------------------
cas.authn.ldap[0].ldapUrl=ldaps://ldap.mistic.lan
cas.authn.ldap[0].connectionStrategy=ACTIVE_PASSIVE
cas.authn.ldap[0].useSsl=true
cas.authn.ldap[0].useStartTls=false
cas.authn.ldap[0].connectTimeout=5000
cas.authn.ldap[0].type=DIRECT
cas.authn.ldap[0].bindDn=uid=admin,ou=ca,dc=mistic,dc=lan
cas.authn.ldap[0].bindCredential=mistic
cas.authn.ldap[0].baseDn=ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
cas.authn.ldap[0].subtreeSearch=true
cas.authn.ldap[0].searchFilter=uid={user}
cas.authn.ldap[0].enhanceWithEntryResolver=true
cas.authn.ldap[0].dnFormat=uid=%s,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
cas.authn.ldap[0].principalAttributeId=uid
cas.authn.ldap[0].principalAttributePassword=userPassword
#========================================
# Attribute retrieval
#========================================
cas.personDirectory.principalAttribute=cn
cas.personDirectory.returnNull=false
cas.authn.attributeRepository.merger=MERGE
#----------------------------------------
# LDAP attributes to retrieve
#----------------------------------------
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].order=0
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].ldapUrl=ldaps://ldap.mistic.lan
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].useSsl=true
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].useStartTls=false
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].bindDn=uid=admin,ou=ca,dc=mistic,dc=lan
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].bindCredential=mistic
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].baseDn=ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
cas.authn.attributeRepository.ldap[0].searchFilter=uid={0}
cas.authn.ldap[0].principalAttributeList=cn,uid,employeeType
/etc/cas/config/services/App1-1111.json
{
  "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.RegexRegisteredService",
  "serviceId" : "https://www\\.mistic\\.lan:8443/app1.*",
  "name" : "App1",
  "id" : 1111,
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  "evaluationOrder" : 1,
  "logoutType" : "FRONT_CHANNEL",
  "logoutUrl" : "https://www.mistic.lan/app1/logout_cas"
  "attributeReleasePolicy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.ReturnAllAttributeReleasePolicy"
   },
  "accessStrategy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.DefaultRegisteredServiceAccessStrategy",
    "requiredAttributes" : {
      "@class" : "java.util.HashMap",
      "employeeType" : [ "java.util.HashSet", [ "10" "20" "30" "40" ] ]
    }
  }
}
/etc/cas/config/services/App2-2222.json
{
  "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.RegexRegisteredService",
  "serviceId" : "https://www\\.mistic\\.lan:8443/app2.*",
  "name" : "App2",
  "id" : 2222,
  "evaluationOrder" : 2,
  "logoutType" : "FRONT_CHANNEL",
  "logoutUrl" : "https://www.mistic.lan/app2/logout_cas"
  "attributeReleasePolicy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.ReturnAllAttributeReleasePolicy"
   },
  "accessStrategy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.DefaultRegisteredServiceAccessStrategy",
    "requiredAttributes" : {
      "@class" : "java.util.HashMap",
      "employeeType" : [ "java.util.HashSet", [ "20" "30" "40" ] ]
    }
  }
}
/etc/cas/config/services/App3-3333.json
{
  "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.RegexRegisteredService",
  "serviceId" : "https://www\\.mistic\\.lan:8443/app3.*",
  "name" : "App3",
  "id" : 3333,
  "evaluationOrder" : 3,
  "logoutType" : "FRONT_CHANNEL",
  "logoutUrl" : "https://www.mistic.lan/app3/logout_cas"
  "attributeReleasePolicy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.ReturnAllAttributeReleasePolicy"
   },
  "accessStrategy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.DefaultRegisteredServiceAccessStrategy",
    "requiredAttributes" : {
      "@class" : "java.util.HashMap",
      "employeeType" : [ "java.util.HashSet", [ "30" "40" ] ]
    }
  }
}
/etc/cas/config/services/App4-4444.json
{
  "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.RegexRegisteredService",
  "serviceId" : "https://www\\.mistic\\.lan:8443/app4.*",
  "name" : "App4",
  "id" : 4444,
  "evaluationOrder" : 4,
  "logoutType" : "FRONT_CHANNEL",
  "logoutUrl" : "https://www.mistic.lan/app4/logout_cas"
  "attributeReleasePolicy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.ReturnAllAttributeReleasePolicy"
   },
  "accessStrategy" : {
    "@class" : "org.apereo.cas.services.DefaultRegisteredServiceAccessStrategy",
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    "requiredAttributes" : {
      "@class" : "java.util.HashMap",
      "employeeType" : [ "java.util.HashSet", [ "40" ] ]
    }
  }
}
10.4 LDAP server configuration files
/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1  localhost
192.168.2.110   cas.mistic.lan          cas
192.168.2.111   ldap.mistic.lan         ldap
192.168.2.200   proxy.mistic.lan        proxy
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1     localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback 
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
/etc/network/interfaces
# This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
# and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).
source /etc/network/interfaces.d/*
# The loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback
# The primary network interface
allow-hotplug enp0s3
iface enp0s3 inet static
        address 192.168.2.101/24
        gateway 192.168.2.200
/etc/ldap/slap.d/slapdssl.ldif
dn: cn=config
changetype: modify
replace: olcTLSCertificateKeyFile
olcTLSCertificateKeyFile: /etc/ldap/certs/ldap.mistic.lan.key
-
replace: olcTLSCertificateFile
olcTLSCertificateFile: /etc/ldap/certs/ldap.mistic.lan.crt
-
replace: olcTLSCACertificateFile
olcTLSCACertificateFile: /etc/ldap/certs/ca.mistic.lan.crt
/etc/ldap/slap.d/lan.mistic.ldif
This file contains the actual list organizational units and users for the MISTIC organization:
### MISTIC LDIF file
## MISTIC.LAN
dn: dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: top
objectClass: dcObject
objectClass: organization
dc: mistic
o: MISTIC
## CA 
dn: ou=ca,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: MISTIC CA
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dn: uid=admin,ou=ca,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: admin
userPassword: mistic
cn: admin
sn: Admin
## USERS
dn: ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: Users
dn: uid=user10,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user10
userPassword: user10
cn: user10
sn: User 10
employeeType: 10
dn: uid=user20,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user20
userPassword: user20
cn: user20
sn: User 20
employeeType: 20
dn: uid=user30,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user30
userPassword: user30
cn: user30
sn: User 30
employeeType: 30
dn: uid=user31,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user31
userPassword: e1NIQX1zTmF4OGR2MVhXSmhoWU9mK05lQnpMN1BsVms=
cn: user31
sn: User 31
employeeType: 30
dn: uid=user40,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user40
userPassword: user40
cn: user40
sn: User 40
employeeType: 40
dn: uid=user41,ou=users,dc=mistic,dc=lan
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
uid: user41
userPassword: e1NIQX1zTmF4OGR2MVhXSmhoWU9mK05lQnpMN1BsVms=
cn: user41
sn: User 41
employeeType: 40
lan.mistic.sh
This scheme can be loaded as many times as needed using an script like this at the LDAP
server:
#!/bin/bash
# Clean directory
echo "Deleting previous organization..."
ldapdelete -v -D cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan -x -w mistic -r dc=mistic,dc=lan
echo
# Create LDAP scheme 
echo "Creating MISTIC organization..."
ldapadd -v -D cn=admin,dc=mistic,dc=lan -x -w mistic -c -f lan.mistic.ldif
echo
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10.5 Applications source code
10.5.1 Home page
The home page is a simple HTML file that links to the applications installed in the server. 
apps/WebContent/index.html
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html>
<head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>MISTIC CORPORATE SITE</title>
</head>
<body>
  <h1>Welcome to the MISTIC Corporate Site</h1> 
  <h4>running at app.mistic.lan</h4>
  
  <h3>App1</h3>
  <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mistic.lan/app1">Enter App1</a>
  
  <h3>App2</h3>
  <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mistic.lan/app2">Enter App2</a>
  
  <h3>App3</h3>
  <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mistic.lan/app3">Enter App3</a>
  
  <h3>App4</h3>
  <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mistic.lan/app4">Enter App4</a>
  
</html>
10.5.2 Client applications 
The Java applications developed are all very similar, because we included no specific business
logic besides configuring them as CAS client Java applications. The exception is App4, which
has an additional requirement that needs specific code, as shown later. 
As an example of a Java CAS client application, these are the files needed to create the App2
client application (App1 and App3 are similar):
app2/src/main/java/lan/mistic/app2/App2Application.java
package lan.mistic.app1;
import org.jasig.cas.client.boot.configuration.EnableCasClient;
import org.springframework.boot.SpringApplication;
import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.SpringBootApplication;
@SpringBootApplication
@EnableCasClient
public class App1Application {
public static void main(String[] args) {
SpringApplication.run(App1Application.class, args);
}
}
app2/src/main/java/lan/mistic/app2/ServletInitializer.java
package lan.mistic.app1;
import org.springframework.boot.builder.SpringApplicationBuilder;
import org.springframework.boot.web.servlet.support.SpringBootServletInitializer;
public class ServletInitializer extends SpringBootServletInitializer {
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@Override
protected SpringApplicationBuilder configure(SpringApplicationBuilder application) {
return application.sources(App1Application.class);
}
}
app2/src/main/java/lan/mistic/app2/App2Controller.java
package lan.mistic.app2;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.Map;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpSession;
import org.jasig.cas.client.authentication.AttributePrincipal;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.ui.Model;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
@Controller
public class App2Controller 
{
    @Autowired
    @HttpSession session; 
    @Autowired
    HttpServletRequest request;
    
    @RequestMapping("/")
    public String index(Model model)
    {
        if (request.getUserPrincipal() != null) 
        {
            AttributePrincipal principal = (AttributePrincipal) request.getUserPrincipal();
            
            final Map attributes = principal.getAttributes();
            if (attributes != null) 
            {
                Iterator<?> attributeNames = attributes.keySet().iterator();
                if (attributeNames.hasNext()) 
                {
                    for (; attributeNames.hasNext(); ) 
                    {
                        String attributeName = (String) attributeNames.next();
                        final Object attributeValue = attributes.get(attributeName);
                        model.addAttribute(attributeName, attributeValue);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        
    return "index";
    }
    @RequestMapping("/logout")
    public String logout_GET() 
    {
    return "logout";
    }
    @RequestMapping("/logout_cas")
    public String logout_CAS() 
    {
        session.invalidate();
        
    return "logout";
    }
}
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app2/src/main/java/resources/application.properties
cas.server-url-prefix=https://www.mistic.lan/cas
cas.server-login-url=https://www.mistic.lan/cas/login
cas.client-host-url=https://www.mistic.lan
app2/src/main/java/resources/templates/index.html
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html xmlns:th="http://www.thymeleaf.org">
<head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>MISTIC APP2</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Welcome to App2 at the MISTIC Corporate Site</h1> 
<h4>running at app.mistic.lan</h4>
  
<p>Welcome user: <b><span th:text="${uid}">UNKNOWN</span></p></b>
<p>Your access level is: <b><span th:text="${employeeType}">UNKNOWN</span></p></b>
<p>You logged in using the credential type: <b><span th:text="$
{credentialType}">UNKNOWN</span></p></b>
<p>at: <b><span th:text="${authenticationDate}">UNKNOWN</span></p></b>
   
Click <a href="/app2/logout">here</a> to log out.  
</html>
app2/src/main/java/resources/templates/logout.html
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html xmlns:th="http://www.thymeleaf.org">
<head>
    <meta http-equiv="Refresh" content="0; url=https://www.mistic.lan/cas/logout" />
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>MISTIC APP1</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>App1 Logout</h1>
</body>
</html>
app2/pom.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-
4.0.0.xsd">
<modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
<parent>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-parent</artifactId>
<version>2.2.1.RELEASE</version>
<relativePath/> <!-- lookup parent from repository -->
</parent>
<groupId>lan.mistic</groupId>
<artifactId>app2</artifactId>
<version>0.0.1</version>
<packaging>war</packaging>
<name>app2</name>
<description>App2@MISTIC.lan</description>
<properties>
<java.version>11</java.version>
</properties>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
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<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-web</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
        <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
        <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-thymeleaf</artifactId>
</dependency>
 <dependency>
<groupId>org.jasig.cas.client</groupId>
<artifactId>cas-client-support-springboot</artifactId>
<version>3.6.1</version>
  </dependency>
    <dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-tomcat</artifactId>
<scope>provided</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-test</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
<exclusions>
<exclusion>
<groupId>org.junit.vintage</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-vintage-engine</artifactId>
</exclusion>
</exclusions>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
<build>
<finalName>${artifactId}</finalName>
<plugins>
<plugin>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-maven-plugin</artifactId>
</plugin>
</plugins>
</build>
</project>
App4, on the other hand, requires some dedicated code in the controller to deal with the extra
validations about the type of credentials used in the login operation. 
app4/src/main/java/lan/mistic/app4/App4Controller.java
package lan.mistic.app4;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.Map;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpSession;
import org.jasig.cas.client.authentication.AttributePrincipal;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.ui.Model;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
@Controller
public class App4Controller {
    @Autowired
    HttpSession session; 
    @Autowired
    HttpServletRequest request;
    
    @RequestMapping("/")
    public String index(Model model)
    {
        if (request.getUserPrincipal() != null) 
        {
            AttributePrincipal principal = (AttributePrincipal) request.getUserPrincipal();
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            final Map attributes = principal.getAttributes();
            if (attributes != null) 
            {
                Iterator<?> attributeNames = attributes.keySet().iterator();
                System.out.println("<b>Attributes:</b>");
                if (attributeNames.hasNext()) 
                {
                    for (; attributeNames.hasNext(); ) 
                    {
                        String attributeName = (String) attributeNames.next();
                        final Object attributeValue = attributes.get(attributeName);                
                        model.addAttribute(attributeName, attributeValue);
                        
                        // Check for a correct credential type 
                        if (attributeName.equals("credentialType") && 
                        ! attributeValue.equals("X509CertificateCredential"))
                  {
                           return "unauthorized"; 
                    }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        return "index";
    }
    @RequestMapping("/logout")
    public String logout_GET() 
    {
    return "logout";
    }
    @RequestMapping("/logout_cas")
    public String logout_CAS() 
    {
        session.invalidate();
        
    return "logout";
    }
}
In case of denying the access, at the application level, an intermediate web page template is
returned to redirect the user to the logout page after showing a message:
app4/src/main/java/resources/templates/unauthorized.html
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html xmlns:th="http://www.thymeleaf.org">
<head>
    <meta http-equiv="Refresh" content="10; url=https://www.mistic.lan/cas/logout" />
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>MISTIC APP4</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>App4 Logout</h1>
<p>You accessed this application using a credential type <b>not allowed</b>.</p>
<p style="color:red">You will be logged out automatically in 10 seconds...</p>
</body>
</html>
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11  Glossary 
authentication: the action of verifying that a user/application is who claims to be.
authorization: the action of granting permissions to access or use a resource.
BYOD: Bring your own device. A policy that allows, and fosters, the users to use their own 
personal devices (e.g. smartphones) in the organization network. 
certification authority: an organization that is trusted to sign other certificates so the client 
can trust the final certificates by validating the chain of certification from the final certificate 
up to the trusted authority (abbr. CA).
commercial off the shelf: a software component, already built by a third party, usually 
selected to be used to compose, or integrate with, a more complex product along with other 
parts (abbr. COTS). 
CDDL: Common Development and Distribution License. A free and open source license from 
Sun Microsystems.
demilitarized zone: a kind of perimeter network (abbr. DMZ).
fork: forking an open source project is the process of copying the codebase under a new name 
and start from there a new, different project from the original, usually due to different criteria 
of the future development of the product by a set of developers or due to changes in the 
licensing of the original product.
LDIF: LDAP Data Interchange Format. A file format to interchange data and provide 
configuration information to LDAP servers.
perimeter network: an intermediate network set between a public network, like the Internet, 
and the internal network to isolate and protect the internal servers from direct access. To 
achieve this, all the connections from the external users pass through servers located in this 
intermediate layer.
predictive project management: an approach to managing a project where all the tasks are 
defined and planned before the actual work on these tasks starts. This approach is also 
known as waterfall project management.
proxy web server: an intermediate server used to cache and serve web pages from an 
external web server from the local network, to avoid consume Internet bandwidth, control the
pages accessed, etc.
reverse proxy: an intermediate server, usually in a DMZ, dedicated to protecting internal 
server from external users.
role base access control: a model to account for the user’s roles in an organization to assign
specific permissions to some set of secured resources (abbr. RBAC)
servlet: a small Java program running in a servlet container or application server, that 
interacts via HTTP/HTTPS requests with its clients.
single point of failure: a component or part of a system that, when unavailable, renders the 
whole system inaccessible.
software as a service:  a paradigm for software distribution where, instead of providing 
copies of the software to the user on some media, like CD-ROM, DVD, etc., the solution is 
provided on the Internet for the users to use it without any local software installation. 
user repository: a database with information about the users in the system with their 
identifiers, names, position, and other corporate attributes, etc. plus meta-data about the 
user like the account status, statistics, etc.
vendor lock-in: an undesired situation where a company or organization has developed its 
solutions tightly based on some proprietary product or technology, thus making the costs of 
changing to another provider or technology very expensive.
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13  GNU Free Documentation License
Version 1.3, 3 November 2008
Copyright © 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <http://fsf.org/> 
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
0. PREAMBLE
The purpose of this License is to make a manual, textbook, or other functional and useful document "free" in the sense of freedom: to
assure everyone the effective freedom to copy and redistribute it, with or without modifying it, either commercially or noncommercially.
Secondarily,  this  License  preserves  for  the  author  and publisher  a  way  to  get  credit  for  their  work,  while  not  being  considered
responsible for modifications made by others.
This License is a kind of "copyleft", which means that derivative works of the document must themselves be free in the same sense. It
complements the GNU General Public License, which is a copyleft license designed for free software.
We have designed this License in order to use it for manuals for free software, because free software needs free documentation: a free
program should come with manuals providing the same freedoms that the software does. But this License is not limited to software
manuals; it can be used for any textual work, regardless of subject matter or whether it is published as a printed book. We recommend
this License principally for works whose purpose is instruction or reference.
1. APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS
This License applies to any manual or other work, in any medium, that contains a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it can be
distributed under the terms of this License. Such a notice grants a world-wide, royalty-free license, unlimited in duration, to use that
work under the conditions stated herein. The "Document", below, refers to any such manual or work. Any member of the public is a
licensee, and is addressed as "you". You accept the license if you copy, modify or distribute the work in a way requiring permission
under copyright law.
A "Modified Version" of the Document means any work containing the Document or a portion of it, either copied verbatim, or with
modifications and/or translated into another language.
A "Secondary Section" is a named appendix or a front-matter section of the Document that deals exclusively with the relationship of the
publishers or authors of the Document to the Document's overall subject (or to related matters) and contains nothing that could fall
directly within that overall subject. (Thus, if the Document is in part a textbook of mathematics, a Secondary Section may not explain
any mathematics.) The relationship could be a matter of historical connection with the subject or with related matters, or of legal,
commercial, philosophical, ethical or political position regarding them.
The "Invariant Sections" are certain Secondary Sections whose titles are designated, as being those of Invariant Sections, in the notice
that says that the Document is released under this License. If a section does not fit the above definition of Secondary then it is not
allowed to be designated as Invariant.  The Document may contain zero Invariant Sections. If  the Document does not identify any
Invariant Sections then there are none.
The "Cover Texts" are certain short passages of text that are listed, as Front-Cover Texts or Back-Cover Texts, in the notice that says that
the Document is released under this License. A Front-Cover Text may be at most 5 words, and a Back-Cover Text may be at most 25
words.
A "Transparent" copy of the Document means a machine-readable copy, represented in a format whose specification is available to the
general public, that is suitable for revising the document straightforwardly with generic text editors or (for images composed of pixels)
generic paint programs or (for drawings) some widely available drawing editor, and that is suitable for input to text formatters or for
automatic translation to a variety of formats suitable for input to text formatters. A copy made in an otherwise Transparent file format
whose  markup,  or  absence  of  markup,  has  been  arranged  to  thwart  or  discourage  subsequent  modification  by  readers  is  not
Transparent. An image format is not Transparent if used for any substantial amount of text. A copy that is not "Transparent" is called
"Opaque".
Examples of suitable formats for Transparent copies include plain ASCII without markup, Texinfo input format, LaTeX input format, SGML
or XML using a publicly available DTD, and standard-conforming simple HTML, PostScript or PDF designed for human modification.
Examples of transparent image formats include PNG, XCF and JPG. Opaque formats include proprietary formats that can be read and
edited only by proprietary word processors, SGML or XML for which the DTD and/or processing tools are not generally available, and the
machine-generated HTML, PostScript or PDF produced by some word processors for output purposes only.
The "Title Page" means, for a printed book, the title page itself, plus such following pages as are needed to hold, legibly, the material
this License requires to appear in the title page. For works in formats which do not have any title page as such, "Title Page" means the
text near the most prominent appearance of the work's title, preceding the beginning of the body of the text.
The "publisher" means any person or entity that distributes copies of the Document to the public.
A section "Entitled XYZ" means a named subunit of the Document whose title either is precisely XYZ or contains XYZ in parentheses
following text  that  translates  XYZ in  another  language.  (Here  XYZ stands  for  a  specific  section  name mentioned below,  such  as
"Acknowledgements",  "Dedications",  "Endorsements",  or  "History".)  To "Preserve the Title"  of  such a section when you modify the
Document means that it remains a section "Entitled XYZ" according to this definition.
The Document may include Warranty Disclaimers next to the notice which states that this License applies to the Document. These
Warranty Disclaimers are considered to be included by reference in this License, but only as regards disclaiming warranties: any other
implication that these Warranty Disclaimers may have is void and has no effect on the meaning of this License.
2. VERBATIM COPYING
You may copy and distribute the Document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, provided that this License, the
copyright notices, and the license notice saying this License applies to the Document are reproduced in all copies, and that you add no
other conditions whatsoever to those of this License. You may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further
copying of the copies you make or distribute. However, you may accept compensation in exchange for copies. If you distribute a large
enough number of copies you must also follow the conditions in section 3.
You may also lend copies, under the same conditions stated above, and you may publicly display copies.
3. COPYING IN QUANTITY
If you publish printed copies (or copies in media that commonly have printed covers) of the Document, numbering more than 100, and
the Document's license notice requires Cover Texts, you must enclose the copies in covers that carry, clearly and legibly, all these Cover
Texts: Front-Cover Texts on the front cover, and Back-Cover Texts on the back cover. Both covers must also clearly and legibly identify
you as the publisher of these copies. The front cover must present the full title with all words of the title equally prominent and visible.
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You may add other material on the covers in addition. Copying with changes limited to the covers, as long as they preserve the title of
the Document and satisfy these conditions, can be treated as verbatim copying in other respects.
If the required texts for either cover are too voluminous to fit legibly, you should put the first ones listed (as many as fit reasonably) on
the actual cover, and continue the rest onto adjacent pages.
If you publish or distribute Opaque copies of the Document numbering more than 100, you must either include a machine-readable
Transparent copy along with each Opaque copy, or state in or with each Opaque copy a computer-network location from which the
general network-using public has access to download using public-standard network protocols a complete Transparent copy of  the
Document, free of added material. If you use the latter option, you must take reasonably prudent steps, when you begin distribution of
Opaque copies in quantity, to ensure that this Transparent copy will remain thus accessible at the stated location until at least one year
after the last time you distribute an Opaque copy (directly or through your agents or retailers) of that edition to the public.
It is requested, but not required, that you contact the authors of the Document well before redistributing any large number of copies, to
give them a chance to provide you with an updated version of the Document.
4. MODIFICATIONS
You may copy and distribute a Modified Version of the Document under the conditions of sections 2 and 3 above, provided that you
release the Modified Version under precisely this License, with the Modified Version filling the role of the Document, thus licensing
distribution and modification of the Modified Version to whoever possesses a copy of it. In addition, you must do these things in the
Modified Version:
A. Use in the Title Page (and on the covers, if any) a title distinct from that of the Document, and from those of previous versions (which
should, if there were any, be listed in the History section of the Document). You may use the same title as a previous version if the
original publisher of that version gives permission. 
B. List on the Title Page, as authors, one or more persons or entities responsible for authorship of the modifications in the Modified
Version, together with at least five of the principal authors of the Document (all of its principal authors, if it has fewer than five), unless
they release you from this requirement. 
C. State on the Title page the name of the publisher of the Modified Version, as the publisher. 
D. Preserve all the copyright notices of the Document. 
E. Add an appropriate copyright notice for your modifications adjacent to the other copyright notices. 
F. Include, immediately after the copyright notices, a license notice giving the public permission to use the Modified Version under the
terms of this License, in the form shown in the Addendum below. 
G. Preserve in that license notice the full lists of Invariant Sections and required Cover Texts given in the Document's license notice. 
H. Include an unaltered copy of this License. 
I. Preserve the section Entitled "History", Preserve its Title, and add to it an item stating at least the title, year, new authors, and
publisher of the Modified Version as given on the Title Page. If there is no section Entitled "History" in the Document, create one stating
the title, year, authors, and publisher of the Document as given on its Title Page, then add an item describing the Modified Version as
stated in the previous sentence. 
J. Preserve the network location, if any, given in the Document for public access to a Transparent copy of the Document, and likewise the
network locations given in the Document for previous versions it was based on. These may be placed in the "History" section. You may
omit a network location for a work that was published at least four years before the Document itself, or if the original publisher of the
version it refers to gives permission. 
K. For any section Entitled "Acknowledgements" or "Dedications", Preserve the Title of the section, and preserve in the section all the
substance and tone of each of the contributor acknowledgements and/or dedications given therein. 
L. Preserve all the Invariant Sections of the Document, unaltered in their text and in their titles. Section numbers or the equivalent are
not considered part of the section titles. 
M. Delete any section Entitled "Endorsements". Such a section may not be included in the Modified Version. 
N. Do not retitle any existing section to be Entitled "Endorsements" or to conflict in title with any Invariant Section. 
O. Preserve any Warranty Disclaimers. 
If the Modified Version includes new front-matter sections or appendices that qualify as Secondary Sections and contain no material
copied from the Document, you may at your option designate some or all of these sections as invariant. To do this, add their titles to the
list of Invariant Sections in the Modified Version's license notice. These titles must be distinct from any other section titles.
You may add a section Entitled "Endorsements", provided it contains nothing but endorsements of your Modified Version by various
parties—for example, statements of peer review or that the text has been approved by an organization as the authoritative definition of
a standard.
You may add a passage of up to five words as a Front-Cover Text, and a passage of up to 25 words as a Back-Cover Text, to the end of
the list of Cover Texts in the Modified Version. Only one passage of Front-Cover Text and one of Back-Cover Text may be added by (or
through arrangements made by) any one entity. If the Document already includes a cover text for the same cover, previously added by
you or by arrangement made by the same entity you are acting on behalf of, you may not add another; but you may replace the old
one, on explicit permission from the previous publisher that added the old one.
The author(s) and publisher(s) of the Document do not by this License give permission to use their names for publicity for or to assert or
imply endorsement of any Modified Version.
5. COMBINING DOCUMENTS
You may combine the Document with other documents released under this License, under the terms defined in section 4 above for
modified versions, provided that you include in the combination all of the Invariant Sections of all of the original documents, unmodified,
and list them all as Invariant Sections of your combined work in its license notice, and that you preserve all their Warranty Disclaimers.
The combined work need only contain one copy of this License, and multiple identical Invariant Sections may be replaced with a single
copy. If there are multiple Invariant Sections with the same name but different contents, make the title of each such section unique by
adding at the end of it, in parentheses, the name of the original author or publisher of that section if known, or else a unique number.
Make the same adjustment to the section titles in the list of Invariant Sections in the license notice of the combined work.
In the combination, you must combine any sections Entitled "History" in the various original documents, forming one section Entitled
"History"; likewise combine any sections Entitled "Acknowledgements", and any sections Entitled "Dedications". You must delete all
sections Entitled "Endorsements".
6. COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS
You may make a collection consisting of the Document and other documents released under this License, and replace the individual
copies of this License in the various documents with a single copy that is included in the collection, provided that you follow the rules of
this License for verbatim copying of each of the documents in all other respects.
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You may extract a single document from such a collection, and distribute it individually under this License, provided you insert a copy of
this License into the extracted document, and follow this License in all other respects regarding verbatim copying of that document.
7. AGGREGATION WITH INDEPENDENT WORKS
A compilation of the Document or its derivatives with other separate and independent documents or works, in or on a volume of a
storage or distribution medium, is called an "aggregate" if the copyright resulting from the compilation is not used to limit the legal
rights of the compilation's users beyond what the individual works permit. When the Document is included in an aggregate, this License
does not apply to the other works in the aggregate which are not themselves derivative works of the Document.
If the Cover Text requirement of section 3 is applicable to these copies of the Document, then if the Document is less than one half of
the entire aggregate, the Document's Cover Texts may be placed on covers that bracket the Document within the aggregate, or the
electronic equivalent of covers if the Document is in electronic form. Otherwise they must appear on printed covers that bracket the
whole aggregate.
8. TRANSLATION
Translation is considered a kind of modification, so you may distribute translations of the Document under the terms of section 4.
Replacing Invariant Sections with translations requires special permission from their copyright holders, but you may include translations
of some or all Invariant Sections in addition to the original versions of these Invariant Sections. You may include a translation of this
License, and all the license notices in the Document, and any Warranty Disclaimers, provided that you also include the original English
version of this License and the original versions of those notices and disclaimers. In case of a disagreement between the translation and
the original version of this License or a notice or disclaimer, the original version will prevail.
If a section in the Document is Entitled "Acknowledgements", "Dedications", or "History", the requirement (section 4) to Preserve its Title
(section 1) will typically require changing the actual title.
9. TERMINATION
You may not  copy,  modify,  sublicense,  or  distribute the Document except as expressly provided under  this  License.  Any attempt
otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License.
However, if you cease all violation of this License, then your license from a particular copyright holder is reinstated (a) provisionally,
unless and until the copyright holder explicitly and finally terminates your license, and (b) permanently, if the copyright holder fails to
notify you of the violation by some reasonable means prior to 60 days after the cessation.
Moreover, your license from a particular copyright holder is reinstated permanently if the copyright holder notifies you of the violation
by some reasonable means, this is the first time you have received notice of violation of this License (for any work) from that copyright
holder, and you cure the violation prior to 30 days after your receipt of the notice.
Termination of your rights under this section does not terminate the licenses of parties who have received copies or rights from you
under this License. If your rights have been terminated and not permanently reinstated, receipt of a copy of some or all of the same
material does not give you any rights to use it.
10. FUTURE REVISIONS OF THIS LICENSE
The Free Software Foundation may publish new, revised versions of the GNU Free Documentation License from time to time. Such new
versions  will  be  similar  in  spirit  to  the  present  version,  but  may  differ  in  detail  to  address  new  problems  or  concerns.  See
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/.
Each version of the License is given a distinguishing version number. If the Document specifies that a particular numbered version of
this License "or any later version" applies to it, you have the option of following the terms and conditions either of that specified version
or of any later version that has been published (not as a draft) by the Free Software Foundation. If the Document does not specify a
version number of this License, you may choose any version ever published (not as a draft) by the Free Software Foundation. If the
Document  specifies  that  a  proxy  can  decide  which  future versions of  this  License  can  be  used,  that  proxy's  public  statement of
acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you to choose that version for the Document.
11. RELICENSING
"Massive Multiauthor Collaboration Site" (or "MMC Site") means any World Wide Web server that publishes copyrightable works and also
provides prominent facilities for anybody to edit those works. A public wiki that anybody can edit is an example of such a server. A
"Massive Multiauthor Collaboration" (or "MMC") contained in the site means any set of copyrightable works thus published on the MMC
site.
"CC-BY-SA" means the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 license published by Creative Commons Corporation, a not-for-
profit corporation with a principal place of business in San Francisco, California, as well as future copyleft versions of that license
published by that same organization.
"Incorporate" means to publish or republish a Document, in whole or in part, as part of another Document.
An MMC is "eligible for relicensing" if it is licensed under this License, and if all works that were first published under this License
somewhere other than this MMC, and subsequently incorporated in whole or in part into the MMC, (1) had no cover texts or invariant
sections, and (2) were thus incorporated prior to November 1, 2008.
The operator of an MMC Site may republish an MMC contained in the site under CC-BY-SA on the same site at any time before August 1,
2009, provided the MMC is eligible for relicensing.
ADDENDUM: How to use this License for your documents
To use this License in a document you have written, include a copy of the License in the document and put the following copyright and
license notices just after the title page:
    Copyright (C)  YEAR  YOUR NAME.
    Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
    under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3
    or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation;
    with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts.
    A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU
    Free Documentation License".
If you have Invariant Sections, Front-Cover Texts and Back-Cover Texts, replace the "with … Texts." line with this:
    with the Invariant Sections being LIST THEIR TITLES, with the
    Front-Cover Texts being LIST, and with the Back-Cover Texts being LIST.
If you have Invariant Sections without Cover Texts, or some other combination of the three, merge those two alternatives to suit the
situation.
If your document contains nontrivial examples of program code, we recommend releasing these examples in parallel under your choice
of free software license, such as the GNU General Public License, to permit their use in free software. 
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